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IS MYSTICAL TESTIMONY UNIFORM?
EDITOR'S NOTE

This note is in the nature of a meditation occasioned by the two articles published in this issue. They prompt the Editor to reflect whether the steady and notable interest in mysticism during our century has brought progress toward a better understanding of that aspect of religion. Dr. Whiteman begins his article with words of Dean Inge saying, "the testimony of the mystics, so strangely uniform, can bear all the weight that we wish to lay upon it." All students of the subject have indeed been impressed by remarkable similarities in the testimonies of mystics. Yet Dean Inge's statement is almost shockingly provocative, if we give thought to it, because it obliges any reflective mind to ask: what is so "strangely uniform" in the testimony of the mystics? and what is "the weight that we wish to lay upon it?"

Dr. Whiteman's testimonies to "the vision of archetypal light" and Dr. Suzuki's account of the "enlightenment experience" in Buddhism, when read one after the other, bear witness as much to varieties of mystical experience as to any uniformity. The "all-conquering" experience of Dr. Suzuki's account centers upon unification and peace, whereas Dr. Whiteman speaks of exaltation and illumination. Do "light" and "enlightenment" refer essentially to one and the same ultimate source in these testimonies? There is no special mention in Dr. Suzuki's account of an experience of elevation out of the body into another sphere of the "Archetypal Light," while Dr. Whiteman gives central emphasis to this. It would not be fitting to describe the spirit of Dr. Suzuki's account as this-worldly, but it might be called anyworldly (if I may coin such a term) rather than other-worldly.

Despite variations of this kind in their reports, mystics the world over may still be considered to bring significantly "uniform" testimony about remarkable experiences of liberation. In one way or other they describe obtaining release from infirm, troubled, and fragmented consciousness into dominant conditions of clear serenity and stable strength. And while the differences in their accounts make problematic any single, uniform interpretation, their testimony requires that interpretation take cognizance of a world in which these remarkable liberations can and do occur.

Both of the articles presented in the following pages observe that

much here remains unsaid about the characteristic fruits and moral consequences of mystical enlightenment. In view of this restriction, we can not very safely say "what weight" (to use Dean Inge's words again) "we wish to lay upon" these testimonies. Yet one point should scarcely escape notice. It is that the value or good which the mystic individually receives through his experience and that which he imparts to others or to society require two distinct weighings. It has been noticed that, just as intensified sunlight quickens nearly every kind of plant, so all kinds of human tendencies are stimulated in the entourage of mystic personalities. There can hardly be any doubt that some mystical enlightenments make important contributions to social as well as personal vitality and moral growth. But instead of weighting them as the dynamic source through which social groups acquire greater moral range, the large balance of evidence suggests, instead, that such growth requires a persistent conjunction of diverse critical factors affecting the common life. To discuss this subject, however, would require much more than an editorial note.

HORACE L. FRIESS, *Editor*

ENLIGHTENMENT

DAISETZ TEITARO SUZUKI

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I

ACCORDING TO MY WAY OF INTERPRETING BUDDHISM, it revolves around Buddha's enlightenment experience. *Buddha* means "the enlightened one," and "enlightenment" is *bodhi*. Both *Buddha* and *bodhi* come from the same root, *budh*, "to wake," "to become aware of," etc. Buddha is an awakened one, one who is awakened from a life of relativity or conditionality. What he teaches is *bodhi*, "enlightenment," or *sambodhi*, "the perfect enlightenment that knows no equal."

Buddha's doctrine is based on his enlightenment, and its purpose to make every one of us attain this enlightenment, so that Buddhism would not remain as something which stands outside oneself and does not concern one personally. Buddha was a consistent personalist and strongly urged his followers to value their personal experience and not merely to rely on authority or a superior personality. Each was exhorted to exert himself for his own emancipation. We read in the *Dhammapada:*

> By oneself, indeed, is evil done; by oneself is one injured. By oneself is evil left undone; by oneself is one purified. Purity and impurity belong to oneself. No one purifies another (v. 165).[1]

This may be considered altogether too individualistic, but, after all, you have to sip your own glass of water when you are thirsty. You cannot get any proxy to do your work in Heaven or Hell. Enlightenment must be personally experienced. Buddhism does not, therefore, consist in Buddha's teaching based on his enlightenment which his followers are told just to swallow even before they can taste it, each by his own personal experience. For this reason, to study Buddhism we must, above all, find out what the perfect enlightenment is.

Let us first enquire then how Buddha came to his enlightenment experience. How did he achieve it? Like all other Indian saints or philosophers, his foremost concern was to be emancipated from the bondage of birth and death, to be liberated from the shackles of existence. As

1. *The Dhammapada*, tr. by S. Radhakrishnan (London, 1950), p. 114.

far as existence is conditioned, it always binds us to something, and the binding means tension. This is the human situation in which we all are. And there is something in every one of us who reflects at all on the actualities of existence which constantly urges us to transcend them. We long for immortality, for eternal life, for absolute freedom, for liberation. Buddha was exceptionally sensitive in this respect. He wanted to be liberated from the bondage of existence by all possible means.

This longing, or desire, or urge is quite human and comes from our being able to reflect on our own situation, to become conscious of our surroundings, inner as well as outer, and to detach ourselves from the life we live. This longing, when translated into metaphysical terms, is our probing into the ultimate significance of reality. This probing presents itself in the form of the following questions: Is life worth living? What is the meaning of life? Whence do we come and whither do we go? What is this self who raises all these questions? Is there any outside agent who handles this universe to satisfy his whims? And so on.

All these and many other questions of a similar nature, however varied they may appear, all issue from one and the same fundamental source. They are all inquiries concerning the ultimate destiny of life, the significance of reality. So we can resolve all these questions into one and say: What is reality? Philosophers and so-called religious-minded people may have their own approach to this final question. And Buddhists, especially Zen Buddhists, have theirs too, which is different from that of philosophers and also from that of the religious-minded. Most of those people try to solve the problem as it is presented to them, that is, objectively. They would take up the problem as it is asked and try to answer it in the way it is given to them.

Buddhists, on the other hand, strive to reach the source or origin itself from whence the problem issues and to see how it came to be asked at all. When the question "What is reality?" is given, instead of taking up the question as such, they go to the questioner himself. The question therefore ceases to be an abstract one; the person, the living person, is brought in. He is full of life, and so is the question, which now is no longer abstract and impersonal but vitally concerns the questioner himself. When a disciple asks, "What is the Buddha-nature or reality?" the master would counter-question and demand, "Who are you?" or "Where do you get the question?" Sometimes the master may call the

questioner's name, and when the monk responds, "Yes, master," the master may remain silent for a while and ask, "Do you understand?" The monk would confess his inability to understand. The master's verdict then would be, "A good-for-nothing fellow!"

The Buddhist idea is that the question is never to be separated from the questioner. So long as they are kept separate, there will be no solution coming the way of the questioner.

II

How did the question ever come to be asked? How did the questioner ever take it into his head to ask the question? The questioning is possible only when the questioner separates himself from reality. He stands outside of it, he detaches himself from it, looks at it and asks the question, "What is this?" This is the privilege allowed only to us humans; the animals have nothing of the sort; they just live reality. There is no question whatever for them. They are neither happy nor unhappy. They just take things as they come. But it is different with us. We know how to put ourselves outside actualities, and reflect upon them, and ask all kinds of questions about them. And thereby we torment ourselves or sometimes amuse ourselves. However, when the question is of vital concern to us, we are far from being amused. It is, indeed, our privilege to be tormented, and therefore it must also be our privilege to be blessed. This can never be so with the animals.

A monk asked Nansen (Nan-ch'üan), "I am told that all the Buddhas of the past, present, and future do not know that 'it' is there while the cat and the ox do know. How is this possible?" The master said, "Before the Buddha entered the Deer Park he knew something of 'it.' " The monk asked, "How about the animals knowing 'it'?" Nansen retorted, "How could you suspect them?"

The idea is that whatever we may mean by "it," "it" is no longer there when we ask about "it" as if "it" were something which can be sought outside ourselves. Every one of us lives "it," and, when we separate ourselves from "it" by asking about it, the result is that we now go out of ourselves and get lost. This is like the centipede which was unable to move any more, because it reflected upon itself to find out how it managed all its legs, one after another, without being hampered or confused. The trouble comes from this separation of questioner and question.

However, the separation of the question from the questioner is quite a natural thing with human beings, for we are so constituted as to have to ask questions everywhere and at every moment of our lives. But, at the same time, this constant questioning is the source of the most agonizing situation into which we so deeply put ourselves. The Buddhist contention is that the solution can never come out of this separation. The separation is needed to ask the question, but the separation is not the key to the solution. On the contrary, it keeps one away from the solution.

To solve the question is to be one with it. When this oneness takes place in its deepest sense, the solution comes out of the identity by itself, without the questioner's trying to solve the question. The question solves itself then. This is the position taken by Buddhists towards the solution of the question, "What is reality?" That is to say, when the questioner ceases to be outside the question, when they are one, when they return to the original situation in which they were. That is, when they return to the very beginning of things when there was yet no dichotomy of subject and object—the time before the separation took place, before there was the creation of the world—this is the time the solution is possible in one's actual experience, and not in the form of a logical demonstration.

When I say this, the reader may ask: When you say "before the dichotomization of subject and object" or "before God created the world," that means "before we were born" or "before any question comes out of ourselves." If this be the case, we have no questions to ask, hence no solution of any kind. Not only this, the enlightenment itself ceases to have any meaning whatever, for all is reduced to absolute emptiness where there was yet no God, no creation, no ourselves, and therefore no questions. This is not a solution but an annihilation.

The trouble is that I have been inadvertently leading the reader in the wrong direction, that is, I have been misleading him and putting him into the very maze out of which my object was to rescue him. For the reader here is preparing for his own funeral rites. What I wanted to do was to take him out of any sort of questioning, arguing, reasoning, etc., so that he would be absolutely free—free from all analytical disputations. This is possible only when the questioner is identified with the question, or when his whole being turns into a great question mark which covers the beginning of the world to its end. This is a matter of experience and not of argumentation. This is the point Buddha reached

after six years of hard thinking and strenuous ascetic discipline. My point will become clearer as we go on.

In any event, Buddhists strongly emphasize the experience of enlightenment, only out of which comes the solution of all problems. As long as there is an intellectual separation going on in one form or another, the question will never be answered. Whatever answer we may have will be no answer in the true sense of the word, for it will come as postulate and not as an actual answer. The basic answer which touches, or rather, threatens the very existence of ourselves is no idle one.

III

The separation of subject and object means the raising of the question, and it is answered not intellectually but experientially, for it is in the nature of the intellect that its answer always calls forth a further series of questions and so can never be final. Besides, an intellectual solution, if it can ever be had, always remains intellectual and never touches one's own being. The intellect is peripheral and dichotomous. In one sense, we can say that the question of reality is answered already even before it is asked, but this will not be understood on the intellectual plane, for this goes beyond it.

While the question and the separation are inseparably linked together, the questioning really means that reality wishes to know itself, and to know itself it was necessary for reality to divide itself into questioner and question. This being the case, the answer must come out of reality itself before the separation took place. This means that the answer lies where the questioner and the question were still one. The question came after the separation; there was no question before the separation. Therefore, when we go where the question has never been raised, there is naturally no question, and where there is no question, there is naturally no answer. This realm of no questioning and answering is where there is a final solution. Hence a Zen philosopher's declaration that the answer is given even before the question is asked.

The question is asked, "What is God?" and the Zen master will say, "Who are you?"

Q. "Can or will Christ save me?"

A. "You are not yet saved."

Q. "Is Buddha really enlightened?" Or "What is enlightenment?"

A. "You are not enlightened."

Q. "What message did Bodhi-Dharma bring from India?"

A. "Where are you this moment?"

There was a high government officer in ancient China who was interested in Zen. He once said to a Zen master,

"A man kept a young goose in a jar. It grew bigger and the jar became too small for it. Now the problem is, How can it be safely extricated without breaking the jar?"

The master called the officer by his name, and the officer replied, "Yes, master."

Immediately then the master said, "There, the goose is out!"

The fact is that the answer always goes along with the question, for the questioning is the answering. But, at the same time, we must remember that unless the question is asked no answer will be forthcoming.

Joshu (Chao-chou) once asked Nansen (Nan-ch'üan), "What is the Tao?" (The Tao here we may take as standing for reality.)

Nansen: "Your everyday mind[2] is the Tao."

Joshu: "Does it need any specific disciplinary orientation?"[3]

Nansen: "No, when you try to orient yourself, you turn against it."

Joshu: "But if one does not, how does one know it to be Tao?"

Nansen: "The Tao does not belong to knowledge, nor does it belong to not-knowing. To know is delusion, not to know is indifference *(wu-chi, avyākṛita)*. When you attain the Tao which is beyond all shadow of doubt, you will realize that it is like the great void so limitlessly expanding, so vastly empty, and no more room is left there for right and wrong."

The Tao is the perfect enlightenment, and what we can state about the Tao will also apply to the enlightenment. When you turn towards it, that is, when a question is asked about it, it is no longer there where

2. "Everyday mind" is in Chinese *p'ing-ch'ang hsin*. *P'ing-ch'ang* means "usual," "ordinary," "everyday," and *hsin* is "mind," "heart," "thought," or "consciousness." The combination is, therefore, "a state of mind in which one ordinarily is." The Buddhist scholars may designate this as "a state of suchness," "reality as it is," or simply "as-it-is-ness." When a monk asked a master, "What is meant by one's everyday thought (or consciousness)?" the master answered, "I eat when hungry; I drink when thirsty." This is a kind of instinctive unconscious life where there is no intellectual or reflective calculation. If we stop here, there will be no human life whose characteristic feature is a highly developed consciousness. To be conscious and yet to be unconscious—this then is "one's everyday mind."

3. *Ch'ü-hsiang* in Chinese. Literally, it means "turning towards," "intentional direction." The above translation may sound too modern, but the idea is there.

the questioner looks. But if you do not search for it, if you do not specifically direct your attention towards it in order to locate it, it will never come within your grasp. The Tao is beyond the reach of logical comprehension, beyond the ken of intellection. All this means that the enlightenment will never be attained as long as you are on this side of the stream.

This I would call the logic of enlightenment. It is when this "logic" is understood that we can, more intelligently than before, approach the question of the enlightenment experience Buddha had, from which Buddhism with all its later developments not only in India but in China starts.

IV

It was for this reason that Buddha could never solve his problem so long as he grappled with it at the level of a dichotomous separation, so long as the questioner was kept apart from the question itself. This meant that Buddha always saw his question dangling before him, of which he wished somehow to make a satisfactory disposition. The story of Buddha is a typical example of what man's quest after reality or truth goes through before he can arrive at a final solution.

In the quest of truth we generally start with the study of philosophy, for the unfolding of our reasoning powers is synchronous with our reflection on reality. We first study the history of thought and see what all those ancient wise men had to say about the problem, which also troubled them immensely. Buddha followed a similar procedure. What he did first, after leaving his home life, was to go to the forest and see the most learned men of his day. This, however, failed to be satisfactory. Philosophy, by its nature, is unable to take us back to where the question has not yet been asked, for this is demanding too much of philosophy, which has its own limitations. It may give us a distant and not at all clarified view of reality itself, but it is possible that the nearer we approach the further it fades away. It is simply tantalizing. It was quite natural for Buddha that he had finally to leave his teachers.

He now tried ascetic discipline. Most of us somehow think that by curbing the claims of the flesh the mind is purified and ready to see the truth as it is. But self-mortification treats the self, the questioner, as a kind of enemy who is to be defeated and crushed. The enemy always stands before the questioner. However desperately the questioner may

struggle in this deadly battle, the enemy will never be vanquished; for, so long as the self or the questioner is alive, he will create a new enemy and have to fight him. The killing of the enemy does not mean the saving of the self or the answering of the question. The self is maintained only when there is a not-self which is an enemy. The self is the creator of the enemy. The questioner is always a questioner, a question-creator.

In ascetic training the questioner is the self. The self is then made to face what is not the self, that is, the enemy, and this enemy is to be disposed of by any means. But the enemy can never be conquered so long as there is the self. The self is never left alone; it always wants something against which it can assert itself, to prove its power, to show itself as something of all-importance. The self loses its selfhood when there are no other selves over which it must demonstrate itself. Asceticism is a form of pride or self-assertion.

Ascetic discipline or moral training can never go beyond the self, but, unless we go beyond the self, there is no chance to get the solution of the problem with which we started our quest for reality. The self must be thoroughly forsaken and emptied of everything that savors of self-hood, that is, of the opposition of self and not-self.

Buddha found this in the most practical way. One day, he wished to stand up from his seat and failed because, from lack of proper nourishment, he was too feeble to support himself. He had been trying to subsist on a minimum amount of food so that his body would be too weak to assert itself. The end was attained, for the body became too weak and could not maintain itself. But the problem of reality and truth remained unsolved just as before; torturing the flesh was not the way to the solution. He then thought, "If he has to die, the questioner dies away with the question still unsolved."

He began to take food and recover his former health and strength, so that he could carry on his inquiries into the all-absorbing question. But how should he proceed now? The intellect failed to give him an answer, and the ascetic mortification was not of much avail. He did not know what to do. He was at a complete loss, but the urge to get a solution to his question was stronger than ever. If his had been a lesser and weaker mind, it might have collapsed under the weight of the situation. Cornered, as it were, into this situation, his whole being reacted against it. He now felt that he had no question to solve, no self to stand up

against an enemy. His self, his intellect, indeed, his whole being was poured into the question. That is to say, he now became the question itself. The differentiation of questioner and question, of self and not-self, disappeared, and there was just one undivided *unknown*. He was buried in this *unknown*.

There was then, as we may picture to ourselves, no Shakyamuni the questioner, no ego-conscious self, no question set before his intellect and threatening his existence, and along with them no heavens sheltering him, no earth supporting him. If we could have stood beside Buddha at that time and looked into his being, we might have detected there nothing but one big question-mark occupying the entire universe. This was the state of his mind, if we can say that he then had any kind of mind. He had been in this state for some little time, when he happened to look up and see the morning star. The beams of light emanating from the star struck his eyes, and it was this incident that brought his entire consciousness back to its ordinary key. The question that had troubled him so persistently and so harassingly now disappeared altogether. Everything acquired a new significance. The whole world now appeared to him in a new light. The following is said to have been his utterance:

> Thro' many a birth in Samsara wandered I,
> Seeking but not finding, the builder of this house.
> Sorrowful is repeated birth.
>
> O house-builder! you are seen. You shall build no house again.
> All your rafters are broken, your ridge-pole is shattered.
> To dissolution goes the mind.
> The end of craving have I attained.[4]

What makes a man feel that he has been going through many a cycle of births and deaths is due to his clinging to the idea of an individual ego-substance *(ātman)*. When this idea is dispelled as he sees into its nature, which is unreal, transient, and conditional, and not at all self-existing, he will no longer be attached to it; for all its rafters, beams, and ridge-pole are now completely destroyed and will never be reconstructed. They were all the products of a dualistic way of thinking. This vanishing of dualism is "dissolution" which is "emptiness" *(śūnyatā)*. "Dissolution," however, may not be a good term for *visaṅkhāra*. *Visaṅ-*

4. *The Dhammapada*, tr. by Narada Thera (Colombo, 1946), p. 26, vv. 153-54.

khāra means the "disappearance of things conditionally existing" *(saṅkhāra)*. According to Buddhist scholars, this phenomenal world is an "aggregate" existence made up of conditions, and not a self-existing reality *(ātman)*. When the mind is said to have attained "dissolution," it means that the mind has entered into a state of "absolute emptiness" *(śūnyatā)*, that it is completely free from all conditionalities, that it is "Transcendence."[5] In other words, the mind gains its ultimate reality, being now above birth and death, self and not-self, good and evil. "I am absolute conqueror." This idea is asserted in the following verse *(gātha)*, which is also regarded as Buddha's utterance at the time of his enlightenment:

> All-vanquishing, all-knowing, lo! am I,
> from all wrong thinking wholly purged and free.
>
> All things discarded, cravings rooted out,
> —whom should I follow?—I have found out all.
>
> No teacher's mine, no equal. Counterpart
> to me there's none throughout the whole wide world.
>
> The Arhat am I, teacher supreme,
> utter Enlightenment is mine alone;
> unfever'd calm is mine, Nirvana's peace.[6]

The "all-vanquishing" or "all-conquering" one is never to be conquered by anybody. He is absolute. He knows no defeat, because he is above all forms of opposition. He is altogether unique. Then he is "all-knowing." This does not mean that he knows things individually, singly, one after another. This is the ordinary knowledge we have at the level of relativity and finitude. The knowledge possessed by the all-knowing one is what I call "*prajñā*-intuition," a knowledge of all things in their totality and unity, the knowledge that lies at the foundation of all individual knowledge. It is that which makes our relative knowledge possible; therefore, it is wholly purged and free from "all wrong thoughts." This kind of knowledge is possessed only by the one in whom there is no division between questioner and question, that is, by Buddha, the enlightened one.

5. This is a term used by Karl Jaspers for Being-in-itself. The *citta* (mind) free from the Aggregates *(skandha)* is the "Transcendence of the world."

6. *Further Dialogues of Buddha,* Part I, tr. by Lord Chalmers, p. 121.

It is for this reason that the Mahayanist tells of Buddha as having uttered the following at the time of his birth—biological or metaphysical as you may choose: "Above the heavens, below the heavens, I alone am the most honored one!"

Ummon (Yün-men), a Zen master of the early Five Dynasties period, had this to say once when he was commemorating Buddha's birthday: "If I saw him when he made this utterance as he came out of his mother's body, I would strike him down with one blow of my stick and give the corpse to the dogs." Ummon in his Zen way really echoes the spirit of Buddha's utterance itself.

V

We must realize that without this enlightenment experience, as I have tried to relate it, as the greatest event in the life of Buddha, there could never have been a religion known as Buddhism. Everything, then, that we connect with the name of Buddhism must go back to this experience of Buddha's, and whenever we encounter any difficulty in the study and understanding of Buddhist teachings we must seek its ultimate solution in Buddha's enlightenment experience. A Buddha is no Buddha without his enlightenment. So is Buddhism no Buddhism without basing itself on the meaning of Buddha's "perfect enlightenment." Thus we can see in what way Buddhism distinguishes itself from all other religions.

That the enlightenment is the very foundation of Buddhism, regardless of its wide range of ramifications as it spread out all over Asia, is seen from the fact that even in the Pure Land doctrine, which calls itself the teaching based on "the other-power" and is apparently against the spirit of "the self-power" doctrine as promulgated by the founder of Buddhism, the enlightenment idea nevertheless forms its basis. Because the Pure Land became possible by Amida's first attaining the *anuttara- samyak- sambodhi,* "incomparable supreme enlightenment," and all that follows from its establishment is no more than the inner unfolding of the enlightenment experience of Amida. While we have to elucidate in more detail what is meant by "the other-power," the main purpose of our rebirth into the Pure Land is the attainment of the perfect enlightenment in this blessed realm where all conditions are most favorably arranged for it. From this we can see that even the Pure Land doctrine, which is generally considered so remote from the "original"

teaching of Buddha, is also, after all, the doctrine of enlightenment. Those who find it difficult to attain enlightenment here and now are persuaded to get or, rather, assured of getting it in their next life by being born into Amida's land.

We now know, I hope, what it was that was experienced by Buddha under the Bodhi tree on the bank of the Nairanjañā about twenty-five centuries ago. The next step in the study of Buddhism will be to find out what the contents of the perfect enlightenment are which makes us "all-conquering" as well as "all-knowing."

THE VISION OF ARCHETYPAL LIGHT

J. H. M. Whiteman

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I

The testimony of the mystics, so strangely uniform, can bear all the weight that we wish to lay upon it." These words of Dean Inge,[1] even if not altogether true, suggest the possibility of founding Theology (which should be the queen of sciences) in the same way as any other study aiming at truth—namely, on direct personal evidence by experienced observers, corroborated by other observers of like training or background, who have devoted themselves to the solution of the same kind of problems. I wish to illustrate this possibility by considering, in all humility, the testimony offered on what is, perhaps, the most important of all mystical experiences. For what could be more important for us than the sight of the goal of life, the final repository and source of all ideals? This is what is claimed for the experience that I shall call "The Vision of God as Archetypal Light." And I hope to show that here, at least, the testimony of mystics is sufficiently uniform to satisfy any normal scientific canons of belief in the actuality and general character of the experience in question.

In speaking thus of "The Vision of God," I do not mean to suggest that there is only one way, or kind of way, in which God can be known—or, to use more accurate language, only one kind of experience which has been referred to by mystics as a knowledge of, or union with, God. If mystical evidence is to be believed, there is at least one other way (and probably two other ways) possessing much the same degree of importance. But I think it will be possible to proceed fairly easily along our chosen path without having to digress into those other fields, which are likely to prove very much more difficult to traverse with reasonable confidence.

The recognition that an experience of this kind is possible may be expected to alter profoundly our attitude to religion, philosophy, psychology, and many other branches of learning (mythology, for example), as well as to give a new direction to the ethical conduct of our lives in

1. *The Hibbert Journal* (Oct. 1952), p. 79.

this world. Whether it does so or not, however, is a subsidiary and largely personal question that I shall try to avoid touching on except at the very end. If the facts are sufficiently evident, their valid implications will probably make themselves felt soon enough. Our concern, then, will be to exhibit facts of experience, as clearly as may be, and not to build upon them with the object of confirming or refuting any established theory or religious doctrine.

II

Since, for Westerners, any mention of God will tend to be viewed in the light of the Christian tradition, I shall begin by considering certain firsthand testimony offered by early and medieval Christian mystics. The testimony in the Old and New Testaments is, on the whole, indirect, parabolic, or ambiguous (no doubt intentionally so, to avoid repelling the eager unlearned multitudes). This ought to be treated last of all, as a court of law would determine the intention of a testator only when all relevant witnesses had been heard.

Turning, then, to one of the greatest of early Christian mystics, we find the following positive and unambiguous statement in the magnificent treatise on "Virginity" by St. Gregory of Nyssa (d.395?):

> I venture to affirm that, to one who has cleansed all the powers of his being from every form of vice, the Beauty which is essential, the source of every beauty and every good, will become visible. . . . To the soul, by virtue of her innocence, there comes the power of taking in that Light. . . . No one in fact is so mentally blind as not to understand . . . that the God of the Universe is the only absolute, and primal, and unrivalled Beauty and Goodness.[2]

And if we ask Gregory to be more explicit, we find him so in the following memorable account of a Trinity in Light. The latter part bears the strong stamp of firsthand experience:

> The Cause of all things, which is our Lord, shines in our hearts by means of the Holy Spirit . . ., and then all the Cause beyond, which is God over all, is found through our Lord, who is the Cause of all things; nor, indeed, is it possible to gain an exact knowledge of the Archetypal Good, except as it appears in the image of that invisible. But then, after passing that summit of theology, I mean the God over all, we turn as it were back again in the racecourse of the mind, and speed through the conjoint and kindred ideas from

2. *Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers,* v (Oxford, 1893), 356 f.

the Father, through the Son, to the Holy Ghost. For once having taken our stand on the comprehension of the Ungenerate Light, we perceive that moment from that vantage ground the Light that streams from Him, like the ray coexistent with the sun . . ., or rather, . . . it will not be a ray of the sun that we shall perceive, but another sun blazing forth, as an offspring, out of the Ungenerate sun, and simultaneously with our conception of the First, and in every way like him, in beauty, in power, in lustre, in size, in brilliance, in all things at once that we observe in the sun. Then again we see yet another such Light after the same fashion, sundered by no interval of time from that offspring Light, and while shining forth by means of it yet tracing the source of its being to the Primal Light.[3]

Another description that fails of being completely specific only by being written in the third person and the present tense is the following, from John of Lycopolis (d.394?):

When the soul is purified and made serene, and the knowledge of Christ the Lord dawns upon it, its mind ascends and beholds the majesty of God, and sees Him to be Incomprehensible and Infinite. When it looks on high, it sees him as at first, and when it looks within itself, it sees Him there. When the mind floats on the sea of the majesty of God and His incomprehensibility, it is amazed and lost in wonder at the serene majesty of God. And forthwith the soul becomes humble, so that if it were possible, when the effulgence of God's majesty envelops it, it would take its place below the whole creation, because of its awe and wondering amazement at the majesty of God. . . .[4]

Several of the early mystics of the Middle East speak of the "Sun of righteousness"—a phrase derived from Malachi (4:2)—but seldom suggest that the phrase is more than merely metaphorical. Clement of Alexandria (d.216) goes much further when he writes: "The image of God is His Word, the Genuine Son of Mind, the Divine Word, the Archetypal Light of Light" (Protreptikos, x),[5] and elsewhere affirms that

gnostic souls . . ., embracing the divine vision not in mirrors or by means of mirrors, but in the transcendently clear and absolutely pure insatiable vision which is the privilege of intensely loving souls, . . . remain honoured with the identity of all excellence. Such is the vision attainable by the pure in heart (Stromata, VII.3).[6]

3. *Ibid.*, Against Eunomius, pp. 84 f.
4. Margaret Smith, *Studies in Early Mysticism in the Near and Middle East* (London, 1931), p. 91.
5. *Ante-Nicene Library*, IV.
6. *Ibid.*, XII.

The "healthful Word," which is the object of this vision, is described as "The Sun of the soul, by whom alone, when He arises in the depths of the soul, the eye of the soul is irradiated" (Protreptikos, VI).[7]

The most celebrated description of a vision of this kind is, of course, that by St. Augustine in Book VII of the "Confessions." The passage is too long and too familiar to quote in full, but the following extracts will show how closely it parallels our previous accounts:

> Into myself I went, and with the eyes of my soul (such as it was) I discovered over the same eye of my soul, over my mind, the unchangeable light of the Lord: . . . superior to my soul, because it made me. . . . Thee when first I saw, thou liftedst me up, that I might see there was something which I might see; and that as yet I was not the man to see it. And thou didst beat back the infirmity of my own sight, darting thy beams of light upon me most strongly, and I trembled both with love and horror. . . .[8]

III

The flowering of medieval Christian mysticism begins with St. Bernard (d.1153). Among his sermons on *The Song of Songs* we find one "On the Various Visions of God" (XXXI). After suggesting, by way of an introductory figure, that the eye, when clouded or diseased, is unable to see light clearly because it has lost its resemblance to the sun, St. Bernard develops his figure into a positive statement which it is hardly possible to interpret as merely metaphorical:

> Were the eye possessed of a purity equal to that of the sun, it would be able, by reason of such perfect resemblance, to contemplate with undazzled gaze that luminous body as it is in its meridian splendour. In the same way, the Divine Sun of Righteousness, "who enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world," can be seen by the soul that is enlightened, according to the degree in which He enlightens her, because of the partial resemblance between them.[9]

A still more definite, though involved, statement upon the vision of the Sun of Righteousness is found in the treatise, *De Quatuor Gradibus Violentae Charitatis,* by Richard of St. Victor (d.1173). Discussion of the second and third degrees of Love is combined with an exposition of

7. *Ibid.,* IV.

8. Wm. Watts, tr., Loeb Classical Library (London, 1912), pp. 371, 373.

9. *St. Bernard's Sermons on the Canticle of Canticles,* trans. by a Priest of Mount Melleray (Dublin, 1920).

three degrees of interior consciousness, referred to the "heaven," the "heaven of heaven," and the "heaven of heavens," the lower degrees of which are each as "earth" to the next higher degree. With regard to the third earth, i.e., the second heaven (if my interpretation is correct), we read:

> This earth has therefore its heaven the third: it has also its Sun. . . . If therefore you are in this heaven the second, or in this earth the third, it is given you to see that Sun under which those spirits who are called Seraphim ardently glow. . . . Truly the joy of this vision is so great, who can describe it? . . . In the second degree of Love, as has been said, the heaven of heavens, and that inaccessible Light, can be seen, but cannot be approached. . . . The third degree of Love is when the mind of man is rapt to that abyss of the Divine Light and whatever is adverse and troublesome is swallowed up in glory. In this state, while the mind is separated from itself, while it is rapt to that secret place of Divine mystery, while in all parts it is set around with the divine fire of Love, intimately penetrated, and ceaselessly on fire, it puts off itself from within, puts on a certain divine condition, and, wholly conformed to the divine Beauty, passes over into another Glory.[10]

At the very close of this account we appear to be taken from one kind of knowledge of God, as Transcendent, to the other *(deificatio)*, which it is not our purpose to consider here.

For Ruysbroeck (d.1381) the image of Christ "the everlasting Sun, Who dwells in the highest part of the spirit" and "makes so great a satisfaction and joy in the heart" was a favorite one. Only rarely, however, as in the following passages, do we glimpse definitely an underlying mystical experience in the midst of the figurative language:

> In the depths of this darkness, in which the loving spirit has died to itself, . . . there shines and there is born an incomprehensible light, which is the Son of God. . . . And here there is nothing else than an eternal contemplation and beholding of the light. . . . All words and everything which a man of his natural powers is able to learn and understand, all this is far beneath the truth which I mean.[11]

Lastly, going just beyond the medieval period, we ought to consider the testimony of St. Teresa (d.1582), if only because her writings are often taken as specially authoritative in Christian Mysticism, and form the chief basis of important studies in the subject. In the *Interior Castle*

10. Migne, 196 (my translation).
11. *The Spiritual Espousals*, Eric Colledge, tr. (London, 1952), p. 18.

she speaks several times of the "center" of the soul, where, in "Spiritual Marriage" (VII.ii), there is peace, whatever conflicts are outside. The soul in that condition experiences certain operations "very forcibly," and understands "that it is endowed with life by God." Moreover, "it is evident that there is someone in the interior of the soul who sends forth these arrows and thus gives life to this life, and that there is a sun whence this great light proceeds. . . ."[12]

Unlike the majority of the other passages we have quoted, which seem to refer to experiences in ecstasy, or "separation" (i.e., from the physical body), this passage, as the context makes quite clear, refers to a kind of "intellectual vision" which may accompany "the most certain assurance" of the Presence of God in active physical life. Such an experience thus belongs to a rather different category from that which we are chiefly considering, and illustrates possibly a third way of knowing God—that is, otherwise than in the face-to-face vision in separation, or by *deificatio,* but obscurely combining these, as it were.

In passing, we might note that these three ways are evidently different from the three mentioned by St. Bonaventura, or the three or four mentioned by St. Thomas Aquinas. The former speaks of the presence of God *in lumine suo,* and two mediate kinds of presence, *in signo proprio* and *in effectu proprio;* while the latter speaks of the *vision of His essence,* and two lower kinds, natural to angels and men, respectively (the last of these involving reasoning from effects), as well as possibly implying a superior "beatific vision."[13] Unfortunately, neither has left any clear statement of the experience on which he bases his classification.

IV

Having surveyed the chief lines of evidence in the Christian tradition, we turn to fresh evidence, more strictly in the Platonic tradition. And here, I think, it will be best to begin with Plotinus, for the reason that in the case of his writings only one interpretation is possible, namely, the mystical one. Afterwards we shall more easily judge the applicability of the mystical interpretation to Plato.

Of the many relevant passages in Plotinus, I select merely the following, as being probably the most definite, and the most inspired:

12. E. A. Peers, tr. (London, 1946), p. 336.
13. A. Farges, *Mystical Phenomena* (London, 1926), pp. 276 n., 272.

To obtain the view of the beautiful, and of the divinity, every man must begin by rendering himself beautiful and divine. . . . Above Intelligence, he will meet Him whom we call the nature of the Good, and who causes beauty to radiate around Him. . . . Thus in her ascension towards divinity, the soul advances until, having risen above everything that is foreign to her, she alone with Him who is alone, beholds, in all His simplicity and purity, Him from whom all depends, to whom all aspires, from whom everything draws its existence, life and thought. He who beholds Him is overwhelmed with love (i.6. 9.7).

It is true that here there is no direct reference to Light. But elsewhere, referring evidently to the same kind of experience, Plotinus speaks of "the sun that shines there on high" (iv.3.11), while, in "the intelligible world," "infinite splendour radiates around," and "Light everywhere meets light" (v.8.4).[14]

The *locus classicus* in Plato is the well-known allegory in Book VII of *The Republic,* comparing our condition in this world to that of prisoners in a cave. We may recall that the philosopher is represented as one who is drawn out of the prison-cave lit by firelight, and lifted up to see the (true) sun. Plato's own explanation of the allegory, studied carefully, may be expected to disclose (in some degree) whether or not he has in mind a "Vision of Archetypal Light" similar to that which is described in our other quotations:

If you compare this region, which is seen by the sight, to the habitation of the prison, and the light of the fire in it to the power of the [physical] sun, and the ascent above, and the sight of things above, to the soul's ascent into the region of intelligence, you will apprehend my meaning. . . . In the intelligible world the Idea of the Good is most remote, and scarcely to be seen: but if it be seen, it is to be deemed as indeed the cause to all of all things bright and beautiful, generating in the visible world light, and its principle the sun, while in the intelligible world it is itself the principle producing truth and intelligence. And this must be beheld by him who is to act wisely, either privately or in public.[15]

The first part of this account, I suggest (judging from the details of its phraseology), refers to a mystical experience in "separation." The latter part, I suggest, aims at showing how mystical and physical modes of awareness are not absolutely distinct, but that the latter are explained, and rationally and wisely controlled, by virtue of the former; and that

14. K. S. Guthrie, tr. (London, 1918).
15. H. Spens, tr. (London, 1906), p. 223.

some glimmer of the mystical experience (or intuition) of the Good should thus be maintained in ordinary physical life.

The position of the pseudo Dionysius Areopagitica must always be a puzzle to those who are unable to reconcile the Platonic and Christian terminology. I here treat him as principally a Neo-Platonist, in spite of the fact that Christian mystics have always regarded him as thoroughly orthodox, and indeed have often taken him as a model. The third chapter of *The Divine Names* begins with a grandly sustained rhapsody on God as "Good" and as "Light." Though a very superficial glance might suggest that the whole is merely a play with figurative language (thus reducing theology to airy abstractions), it does not need much knowledge of the subject to suspect that Dionysius is in fact describing, more or less literally (in terms of mystical perceptions), some comprehensive mystical experience.

> The Good God . . . stirs and opens the eyes which are fast shut and weighed down with darkness, and gives them first a moderate illumination; then (when they taste the Light and desire It more) He giveth Himself in greater measure and shineth in more abundance on them "because they have loved much," and ever He constraineth them according to their powers of looking upwards.
>
> And so that Good which is above all light is called a Spiritual Light because It is an originating Beam and an Overflowing Radiance, illuminating with its fulness every mind above the world, around it, or within it, and renewing all their spiritual powers, embracing them all by its transcendent compass and exceeding them all by its transcendent elevation. And It contains within Itself, in a simple form, the entire ultimate principle of light; and is the Transcendent archetype of Light; and, while bearing the light in its womb, It exceeds it in quality and precedes it in time; and so conjoineth together all spiritual and rational beings, uniting them in one.[16]

V

At this point it seems to me likely that, for many readers, our subject, after an initial clarification, may begin to take on a distant or dogmatic coloring, owing to the fact that we have had to lay tremendous weight on evidence from authors of many centuries ago, speaking in a strange dialect, while evidence for the same thing today is conspicuous by its absence. It might even be argued that lack of corroboration today would suggest that our interpretation of the earlier accounts might,

16. C. E. Rolt, tr. (London, 1920), pp. 94 f.

after all, have been optimistic, or even fundamentally misconceived. Thus it seems to me imperative that the Vision should be shown to be fully possible today also, and, as I have so far been unable to find any sufficiently explicit twentieth century accounts, I am obliged to depend on the description of such experience as has been granted me—observing always that one person's need is not another's, and that respect of persons in such a matter is utterly wrong.

By way of introduction, I should explain that, for me, there are two fundamental mystical practices, which I call *Recollection* and *Obedience:* the former fulfilling us as regards perception by a developing of the imaginal powers until time can, as it were, be stopped or put aside, while the spirit is free within; and the latter fulfilling us (on the ground of Recollection) as regards our intuitively intellectual powers, by a conquest of the tendency to decide for oneself absent-mindedly or presumptuously, instead of being continuously open to a higher Wisdom. These practices have first to be discovered (and they can only be discovered, I believe, if we have a *need* for them, rather than a *desire),* and then the corresponding fulfilled condition has to be maintained continously (as by the "wise virgins"); otherwise no mystical experience is likely. And the overall aim should be, not power or knowledge, but the selfless Freedom, springing from above, of spiritual propriety in every form of consciousness—"Thou shalt have none other gods but Me."

The account that I now give is dated November, 1932, at which time none of the descriptions quoted above were known to me. Thus, although the inner condition during the experience was familiar, being similar to what had been maintained in ordinary life, the perceptive details were entirely unexpected. I have used the title "Lord" in the account as a name for the Divine Wisdom, which appears as the object of "Obedience" when that faculty becomes vividly and continuously active. But no name actually satisfies me as appropriate, "God" being too abstract and general, while "The Good" seems more suited to another kind of knowledge, and is also perhaps too impersonal a term.

Throughout the day previous to this experience I was kept in vivid consciousness of the continuous state of Obedience, powerfully directed as to the Lord, though He was not, of course, seen so long as I was occupied in the physical world. The separation did not begin from a dream state; but during the night I became fully awake to the quality of this directed Obedience, now stronger and more clearly known. Almost immediately, the separated form

was drawn upwards, quickly, and as if through a great distance, but without any loss of steady balance or of the feeling of peace (which remained inside, unmoved).

All at once, without any further change, my eyes were opened. Above and in front, yet in me, of me, and around, was the Glory of the Archetypal Light. Nothing can be more truly Light, since that Light makes all other light to be light; nor is it a flat material light, but a creative light of Life itself, streaming forth in Love and Understanding, and forming all other lives out of its substance: a Light became Life not through addition to material light, but by the removal of the impurity of fixation.

What can we say of the contemplating soul? Formed by the Life itself, she was yet face to face with its Glory, poised and held aloft as in the air, while the Power streamed forth and past, shaping her form as to the wind—poised through the adoration of love and total submission; held aloft through His Majesty and Mercy.

Far below, as things can be seen at those times without turning away, there appeared something like the surface of the earth. But this was only for a moment, in a representative vision, to make clear the immense height to which the soul had been raised, and her nearness to the Sun.

How can Source be described? How its direction? Though upwards and forwards, it was not a geometrical direction, more or less so, and in relation to something else; but an absolute direction, exactly so, by its own archetypal nature. Source it was, of Life and Truth, being the source of all Ideas of Life and Truth; yet manifested as in space.

And Lo! suddenly, without any shift of direction, the Light was seen in a point. And in that point was the Idea of *Twelve;* not a twelve that could be counted, or that appeared separable into parts; but nevertheless the Idea of Twelve that enters into all our concepts of twelve; incomprehensible, except in the Godhead. And passing even within that Light, so that, while the direction appeared to remain, the light was not (so that I appeared to see in dark ness) I came to the Archetypal Idea and Name of *The Father.*

But now understanding and obedience began to wane, and obscurity of mind insensibly took hold, because of the encroachment of self. For a moment I seemed to see, at a lower level, a representation of the Idea of Seven; but whether this was objective, or prompted by imagination, could not be distinguished. Then presently, consciousness settled again in the physical body.

VI

I should like now to investigate some evidence of wider scope from mystical or sacred writings, interpreted (in case of difficulty) in the light of a few other personal experiences. For, though already our stance may be firm, if the ground we stand on is too restricted, we may overbalance when we try to turn in unaccustomed directions. As already mentioned,

I shall try to avoid asserting or arguing for special conclusions, but a few suggestions or personal impressions may be in place.

With regard to the *Raising,* which is a feature of so many accounts of this Vision, I suggest that this ought to be considered as neither imaginative nor merely abstract, but as having the intense reality of what is intellectually archetypal. Denying any origin in imagination, St. Teresa writes:

> It is a fact that . . . there begins within the soul a flight (I know no other name to give it) which . . . is so clearly a movement that it cannot possibly be due to fancy. When the soul, as far as it can understand, is right outside itself, great things are revealed to it.[17]

Nevertheless, if we are unable to conceive of a mode of perception that is neither physical nor imaginative, and yet more real than either, I believe we make a better approach to what is required by thinking in terms of intellectual or psychological categories (certain attitudes of mind being genuinely in a *higher* category than others) than by thinking in terms of what is merely physical. In reading the following passage from the Chāndogya Upanished, for example, we need to think primarily of archetypal intellectual or psychological character, if the phraseology is not to strike a crude note:

> Now when he rises up from the body he mounts upwards by those very light-beams (of the Sun) while as if repeating the Name [Om]. When he is ready to cast away his mind he approaches the Sun. This is indeed the door to the (intelligible) world. The (spiritually) informed have entrance; the (spiritually) uninformed (meet with) obstruction (8.6.5).[18]

The submission and abandonment of mental powers here hinted at as necessary recalls the terms used by Richard of St. Victor, in a passage quoted above. In the same way, St. Bonaventura writes of the soul about to enter the last stage of contemplation: "There remains for it to transcend these things every power of the human intellect in contemplation and to leave behind not only this world of sense but also itself." And again, "That this transport may be perfect, it is necessary that all intellectual operations be abandoned within it."[19]

17. *Interior Castle,* VI.V.

18. Translation mine. In this and the following quotations from Ch. Up. I have tried to give as literal a rendering as possible, so that questions of interpretation need not arise.

19. A. C. Pegis, *The Wisdom of Catholicism* (London, 1950) pp. 283 f.

In view of such extreme language, apt to be misleading today (when we take words very literally), it ought to be remarked that the Vision of Archetypal Light evidently destroys neither the perceptive powers, nor the power of recognising intellectual archetypes, nor the power of loving. These, moreover, repose in a *Proper Form,* which possesses "the glorious freedom of the children of God." What is abandoned or cut off is, therefore, the *lower* intellectual operations—reasoning, undercurrents of imagery, predispositions to self-sufficiency, and bodily instincts —which are thought of as our self of this world, but which must be abandoned before we can know our Proper Form, built around an archetypal higher Self. This point of view, frequent enough in Christian mysticism, is also put clearly in the Chāndogya Upanishad:

> Now he who, tranquillized (in soul), having risen up from the body and approached the Supreme Light, comes forth to manifestation in his proper form, the same is spoken of as the (true) Self. It is beyond death; it is beyond fear; it is God [Brahma]. Of that God, the name is "Goodness-and-Truth" [*satya*] (8.3.4).

The Proper Form is healed from all its (spiritual) diseases. It has attained to Freedom by the removal of obstructions; consequently it becomes more receptive instead of less:

> The crooked shall be made straight, and the rough places plain. And the glory of the Lord shall be revealed (Isa. 40:5).
>
> That which is incomplete becomes complete. The crooked becomes straight; the empty becomes full. . . . That is why the self-controlled man holds to Unity and brings it into manifestation. He looks not at self; therefore he sees clearly (Tao Teh King, 22).[20]

A similar conception lies at the root of Buddhism—bonds and "fetters," obsessive attachments *(āsavas),* and everything that is improper and adverse *(dukkha)* in the "ceaseless round" of *saṃsāra,* being done away with by Release *(mokkha)* and the deathless Freedom *(nibbāna)*:

> I have attained to the topmost knowledge. . . . I know it in its highest excellence. . . . I have seen the Calm, realizing which the Tathāgata [one who has attained] cannot fall into error. . . . When one reaches up to the Release called the Beautiful, he knows indeed what Beauty is.[21]

20. Isabella Mears, tr. (London, 1922).
21. F. L. Woodward, *Some Sayings of the Buddha* (London, 1925), p. 208.

That which is seen as Archetypal Light must reasonably be capable of affecting the other senses, for why should the sense of sight be the only one surviving in the highest regions of knowledge? In this connection, it may be permissible to refer to a few other facts of experience. A wonderful comforting warmth can sometimes be felt, in a separated state, flooding the bodily form. In one such experience (May, 1939) this warmth was received, or rather, my attention was opened to its existence, because of an intensity of love springing up in me towards the Wisdom coming forth from the divine Sun. The archetypal form of warmth (fully real), and the love, have not then accidentally come together; but the love implicit in warmth has been revealed, because the mind no longer shuts it out.

If, in a separated state, one is able to remember the Lord (or whatever Named may be attached to the object of Obedience), the Source of Light will always appear, usually with a sudden lifting up, a turning to the right, or other manifesting perceptions. In an experience of April, 1934, I was raised up in this way three times in succession, appearing to slip back again a little after each raising. The Sun was seen as a general blaze of dazzling light in a certain direction, forwards, and each time it was seen, my breath was taken in astonishment at its glory. For breathing also is a fundamental faculty of the proper form within, co-ordinated with our powers of intellectual discernment and moral control.*

As regards sound, no direct manifestation of the divine Source in that way has been granted me. But a few experiences at a lower level have suggested that spiritual sound, rather unexpectedly, more readily impresses us with startling spatial reality than does even spiritual light. The sudden opening of the ears to the spiritual impression of a loud sound suggests at once the concept of a Judgment, which only those who have inner faith and humility can withstand (because only they are accustomed to listening obediently). This further quotation from the Chāndogya Upanishad seems to refer to some such experience:

> Now the very same Light that shines beyond this heaven, back of All, back of everything, in the unsurpassable highest worlds, shines verily within man. Of it there is this evident (experience): namely, when one discerns it (tangibly) as a warmth in the body. And of it there is this audible (experience): namely, when one who has grasped (it by the) ears hears it like a shout, a roar, or the noise of a flaming fire. That same visible and audible (glory) is to be faithfully

contemplated [upāsīta]. He becomes beautiful (of soul) and estimable (in character) who verily knows this, who verily knows this (3.13.7-8).[22]

Another experience that has not been granted me, though I suspect that it is not only possible but rather frequent among those who know the Vision of the Divine Sun, is that of the Idea of the Son. The Tao Teh King, for instance, teaches as follows:

There was a Being already perfect before the existence of Heaven and Earth. It is Calm. It is formless. It stands alone and changes not . . . I do not know its name. For a title we call it the Tao (25).

It appears to be Ancestor of all things. . . . I do not know whose Son it is; it existed before God was manifest in form (4).

Plotinus tells us that in ecstasy one sees "the Divinity beget an offspring of incomparable beauty," and thus "his Son has manifested himself externally. By him, as by an image, you may judge the greatness of his Father" (v.8.12).

Two verses from the Ṛig Veda are interpreted by the Chāndogya Upanishad in the same sense:

They behold the Light of the First and Primal Offspring shining from above, (a Light) which is kindled by day, radiant (with energy). Beholding (that) higher Light, above darkness, ourselves beholding (that) higher God among the gods [*devas*, angels], we attained to Sūrya the Sun, the Primal Light, verily the Primal Light (3.17.7).

Similarly, in Hymn x.121 of the Ṛig Veda, the honoured epithet, *Hiraṇyagarbha*, of the Creator, described as "born only lord of all created beings," is properly translated "The Golden Offspring"—*garbha* meaning womb or foetus.

More precisely still, we read in the beautiful Hymn ii.35, to "The Son of the Waters" (Agni, the Divine Fire), that he is "the immovable God," who "in the waters, with bright divinity, holy, eternal, widely shines forth"; that "the Son of the Waters, the Lord, by the greatness of divine dominion, has created all beings." And finally, known by a "dear, secret Name," he is "stationed in this highest place, shining for ever with undimmed (rays)."[23]

22. The remarkable expression *karṇāvapigrahya* means literally one who is "ear-received," "ear-perceived," or "ear-grasped." The classical commentators take it in a material sense as "one with stopped ears." But stopping the physical ears with the fingers would in no way assist spiritual hearing, which is implied by the first part of this quotation.

23. A. A. Macdonell, *A Vedic Reader for Students* (London, 1917), pp. 67-78.

VII

The Middle East of the first century A.D., permeated with mystical ideas from Greece, Egypt, Asia Minor, Babylonia, Persia, and India, was a fertile ground for the seed of a new religion, or a new synthesis of religions. I propose to conclude this essay by considering certain passages from the New Testament, bearing closely on what has now been said concerning the Vision of Archetypal Light, adding only a few comments designed chiefly to preserve an open mind and a level judgment—these being essential prerequisites for mystical perception and comprehension. I have made a few slight changes in the A.V. translation where it appears that a closer adherence to the Greek original clarifies the mystical sense.

A very striking passage is the opening of St. John's first letter, which deserves to be studied closely in the light of the mystical knowledge that we now know to have been widespread at the time:

> That which was Primal [*ap' archēs*], which we have heard, which we have seen with our very eyes, which we have contemplated, and which our very hands have tangibly felt concerning the Logos of Life—for the Life was manifested, and we have seen it, and bear witness, and we announce to you the eternal Life which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us—that which we have seen and heard, we announce to you also. . . . And this is the message that we have heard from Him and announce to you, that God is Light, and in Him is no darkness at all (1:1-5).

I have preferred the word *Primal* here as having, like the Greek *archē*, two senses—temporal and logical; whereas the A.V. "in the beginning" misleads at once by suggesting past time only.

A similar protestation is made in the second letter of St. Peter:

> For it was not cleverly devised fables that we followed when we made known unto you the power and Appearing of our Lord Jesus Christ, but we were eyewitnesses of his majesty. . . . And this voice which came from heaven we heard, when we were with Him in the mount (1:16, 18).

The materialistic meaning that might be read into this is hardly applicable to the opening of the letter to the Hebrews, with its splendid mystical language:

> God . . . hath in the extremity of these days spoken unto us in His Son . . . who, being the brightness of His glory and the outward image of His substance, upholding all things by the Logos of His power, when he had by Him-

self made purification of our failings, sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high (1:1-3).

With regard to these three quotations, it may profitably be deliberated, I suggest, whether or not we have accounts of the *Archetypal Light,* the *Healing,* the *Warmth of Love,* the *Raising,* and other mystical revelations. Is it impossible that the following familiar passage from St. Paul may similarly refer to the *Sound of Judgment,* the *Raising,* and the *Air*?

For the Lord himself shall descend from heaven in (the sound of) a commanding shout, an archangel's voice, and the trumpet of God. . . . Then we who live, and remain about, shall be caught up together with them in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air. . . . But ye, brethren, are not in darkness, that that day should overtake you as a thief (1 Thess.4:16-17; 5:2).

The phrase, "we who live," appears again in II Cor.4:11, where it means, "we who have 'knowledge of the glory of God.' " The *trumpet,* also, may have been suggested to Paul by his knowledge of Greek religion, for according to Plutarch, among the Argives there was a custom of summoning Dionysos out of the waters by the sound of trumpets (and Dionysos was "he of the miraculous birth," the Divine Child, the god of "spiritual intoxication" and *theosis).*[24]

Concerning the similar apocalyptic statements in the Gospels, we may likewise deliberate whether to interpret these mystically (with a certain poetic licence), or else suppose that the authors either made a mistake as to the time of a "general judgment" (which they somehow had independent and partly accurate knowledge of), or were merely caught up in "fables." One of these conclusions must, I think, apply to the following, for example:

For as the lightning cometh out of the east, and shineth even unto the west, so shall also the Appearing of the Son of man be . . . , and they shall see the Son of man coming in the clouds of heaven, with power and great glory. . . . Verily I say unto you, This generation shall not pass away till all these things be fulfilled. . . . Watch, therefore, for ye know neither the day, nor the hour, wherein the Son of man cometh (Matt. 24:27, 30, 34; 25:13).

The relevant passages in St. Paul are mostly free from such ambiguity. The letter to the Colossians, for instance, defines the Son in

24. J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion* (Cambridge, 1908), p. 433. Compare also the myth of Pan blowing the conch at the Titanomachia.

relation to the Father, using phraseology that by now will be quite familiar, as "the Son of his Love . . . who is the image of the invisible God, the first-begotten before all. . . . And He is before all things, and in Him all things cohere" (1:15,17).

In one way, however, St. Paul goes very much further than merely declaring the vision and the knowledge. Like St. Teresa, he conceives of the Presence as sustained in us, not necessarily in ecstasy, but in ordinary life, in the same way as in a state of full knowledge and experience, though far less vividly ("as in a mirror, darkly"), always provided we direct our ideals upwards and forwards unceasingly, with some knowledge of the Source. Then the same kind of *Healing* and uplifting process (according to his teaching) comes into operation:

> We all, with open face reflecting as a mirror the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image from glory to glory. . . . For God hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God, in the face of Jesus Christ (II Cor.3:18; 4:6).

"His face," says St. Bernard, discussing this favorite figure from the Psalms, "is not an object possessing beauty of form, but rather is the Source of all beauty and all form." And St. Bernard, too, is speaking not so much of the Vision as of a "mode of the Divine Presence" which all may have knowledge of.[25]

If, indeed, mystical experience were merely a gift conferred on a few favored persons, and on rare occasions between which one lived entirely as before, with the same passions and pains and in the same spiritual darkness, then speaking of it would be nothing but a sop to idle curiosity, and no one would lose by ignoring it. But there is another viewpoint—that mystical experience is essentially a oneness and purity of aim that everyone may have here and now in some degree, depending on the readiness of his response to intuitions of beauty and goodness in all things, on grace of behavior, humility of intellect, depth and sensitive poise of feeling, and unceasing faithfulness to these ideals—in short, everything that makes us free human beings instead of wild animals bound by their instincts. If this is so, then an intelligent attempt to communicate some knowledge of the manner in which that essential oneness and purity makes itself tangible must surely strike a chord in all who listen with sympathetic ears, and must stir and strengthen their intuitive powers.

25. *Op. cit.*, XXXI, p. 372.

In some such way, I suggest, we can explain the spontaneous and enlivening appeal of certain forms of figurative language—"Light," "exaltation," "inspiration," "warm-heartedness." And then the confidence may be expected to grow and work within us that those intuitions are not second-rate in reality, "merely subjective" *epiphenomena,* or instinctive "behavior patterns," but are able to remain in far intensified form while the outer world passes away. And so (St. Paul completes his argument), since we are then "no more children (or mariners), tossed to and fro with every wind of doctrine . . . , the whole body (of the spirit), fitly joined together, maketh increase unto the building up of itself in love" (Eph. 4:14-16).

That the work of mystical description does, in fact, bear this fruit is shown by the readiness of every mystic to declare his indebtedness to those who have trodden the path before.

ON ALLEGED CONTRIBUTIONS OF RELIGION TO ETHICS

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THE PERSISTENCE OF THE RELIGIOUS CONCERN under the most varied cultural circumstances suggests the superficiality (though not necessarily the irrelevance) of those explanatory theories which view religion as a symptom of some profound, but theoretically superable, social disorder. Certainly the most influential of these views, the Marxist and the Freudian, cannot be dismissed as mere errors; they have too clearly perceived certain regular abuses of religious sensitivity, and they have stated these in such a bold and open way that it would seem unlikely that anyone would responsibly resist their simple truth: "Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the feelings of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of unspiritual conditions. It is the opium of the people . . .";[1] "religion . . . the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity."[2]

Both Marx and Freud view religion as a *corrigible* disorder, a fact which is in itself an index of their strongly utopian inclinations; that is, they deny the incorrigibility of the religious problem, the impossibility of achieving a human condition in which the religious concern ceases to be relevant:

> The religious reflex of the real world can, in any case, only then vanish, when the practical relations of everyday life offer to man none but perfectly intelligible and reasonable relations with regard to his fellowmen and to nature.[3]

> These [religious ideas] . . . are illusions, fulfilments of the oldest, strongest and most insistent wishes of mankind . . . but, after all, it is the destiny of childishness to be overcome. Man cannot remain a child forever; he must venture at last into the hostile world. This may be called *"education to reality,"*

1. Karl Marx, "Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie," *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* (1844), quoted by Otto Rühle, *Karl Marx: His Life and Work* (London, 1929), p. 57.

2. Sigmund Freud, *The Future of an Illusion,* translated by W. D. Robson-Scott (New York, 1928), p. 76.

3. Karl Marx, *Capital* (Modern Library edition), translated by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, pp. 91.

. . . in the long run nothing can withstand reason and science, and the contradictions religion offers to both are only too palpable.[4]

Religion then is for both Marx and Freud a *pathological,* sick, "abnormal" concern of men; it is a special ailment which, at least in principle, need not afflict *every* human culture; it cannot be relied on for insights about the improvement of community life since it is itself a disorder to be overcome; *it does not raise questions about the universal conditions of human existence.* Of course this way of stating their view hints broadly at the only effective method for defending the intellectual respectability of the religious issue.

There are seemingly (to follow the hint) a set of peculiarly difficult problems which man faces because of the very nature of his own existence. The following might be part of such a catalogue: no deliberate commitment which he can make, no purposeful program of activity, can permanently postpone his own death; nor can any of his choices upset the externally imposed conditions and boundaries under which he makes his choice or is able to choose; nor can he, regardless of his motives, know or control the full consequences, the possible evils, that follow from his acts; nor can he fulfill all the potentialities of his nature, the talents and infinite aspirations which he may consider; nor can he find a purpose behind the order of nature to certify his own purposive activity. The interesting feature in these questions and others like them is there *inescapability: there is no human culture that can solve them, but every human culture must raise them.*

In more traditional terms, man participates in *nonbeing* and cannot, as man, overcome this condition. This is essentially the view of Professor Paul Tillich, for example, who has recently sought to state a conception of religion which is not susceptible to any sort of merely reductive analysis. Tillich terms such problems as those enumerated here forms of "existential anxiety":

. . . anxiety is the state in which a being is aware of its possible nonbeing . . . anxiety is the existential awareness of nonbeing. "Existential" . . . means that it is not the abstract knowledge of nonbeing which produces anxiety but the awareness that nonbeing is a part of one's own being. . . . Anxiety is finitude, experienced as one's own finitude. This is the natural anxiety of man as man. . . .[5]

4. Freud, *op. cit.,* pp. 52, 86, 94.
5. Paul Tillich, *The Courage to Be* (New Haven, 1952), p. 35.

He therefore contrasts these with the problems of "pathological anxiety," which he understands to be "a state of existential anxiety under special conditions."[6] And the religious concern for man is to reconcile himself to the existentially threatening conditions of his life, to take upon himself his "normal" and inescapable anxieties.

Tillich's own formula is "the courage to be," by which he means the positive affirmation of one's being under the disruptive conditions of existence (entailing, as it does, nonbeing).[7] But the reconciliation requires human participation in the "power of being" ("being-itself") which precedes ontologically the "split" between being and nonbeing; this commitment Tillich terms "courage"[8] or "the encounter with God":[9]

> "God" is the answer to the question implied in man's finitude; he is the name for that which concerns man ultimately. This does not mean that first there is a being called God and then the demand that man should be ultimately concerned about him. It means that whatever concerns a man ultimately becomes god for him; and, conversely, it means that a man can be concerned ultimately only about that which is god for him . . . ultimate concern must transcend every preliminary finite and concrete concern. It must transcend the whole realm of finitude in order to be the answer to the question implied in finitude.[10]

Here we have, then, an apparently defensible account of the religious concern which cannot in any way be said to depend on the special historical conditions of any particular culture; the concern is a universal one, implicit in every human career. And, therefore, every existing career is to some degree, no matter how inarticulately, functioning in a religiously significant manner, affirming its own being in existence, accepting the divine acceptance of finite being: "religiously speaking, one would say that one accepts oneself as accepted in spite of one's despair about the meaning of this acceptance."[11]

But this very solution of the status of the religious question (which frankly seems to be a most powerful and convincing solution) would seem to bear in its wake certain other not altogether negligible discoveries. The religious concern is, first, not separable from the other issues which man faces daily; it is, on the contrary, a dimension of all his ac-

6. *Ibid.*, p. 65.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 66.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 181.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 165.
10. *Systematic Theology*, I (Chicago, 1951), 211.
11. *The Courage to Be*, p. 176.

tivities rather than a distinctive type of activity. And second, although it may function to inspire all sorts of commitments in the existential life of man, it provides only a negative criterion of the worth of these commitments. This follows because no existential career can escape its own essential anxieties, no program of community life can be regarded as a good one merely because it seeks to meet the religious concern. The moral concern is to improve the quality of human life within the boundaries of finite existence; the religious must treat all alleged improvements as suffering from the same inability to overcome life's existential anxieties and, at the same time, applaud (this being its negative and formal function) all commitments which sustain "the courage to be."

It may very well be true that with increasing historical sensitivity the higher ethical attitudes alone tend to support such courage, and it may be defensible to argue that their discovery was the outcome of religiously significant revelation; but the effort to determine the ethical status of alternate claims depends on the selection of criteria from the domain of existence and cannot require its transcendence in union with the divine. *The criteria for judging the positive worth of human conduct are to be applied to distinctions within the boundaries of existence; religious sensitivity contributes only the negative insight that no reforms in accord with such criteria can escape the strictures of these very same boundaries;* that is, ethically considered, religion functions as an anti-utopian force.

The moral insights of religious experience are legitimate materials to be ethically evaluated, but they are not self-certifying or self-justifying; to deny this is simply to support a thorough-going authoritarian position. And merely ethical claims cannot solve the religious problem, though every such claim implies some measure of religious adjustment, for the religious problem pervades every possible human commitment in the same incorrigible way. This is obvious in the teachings of Martin Luther:

> For . . . works are acceptable not for their own sake, but because of the faith which alone is, works and lives in each and every work *without distinction*, however numerous and various they are. . . .[12]
>
> . . . if these things are done with such faith that we believe that they please

12. Martin Luther, *Treatise on Good Works* (1520), translated by W. A. Lambert in *Works of Martin Luther,* I (Philadelphia, 1915), 190. Italics my own.

God, then they are praiseworthy, not because of their virtue, but because of such faith, for which *all works are of equal value. . . .*[13]

and in those of St. Augustine:

For men are separated from God only by sins, from which we are in this life cleansed *not by our own virtue,* but by the divine compassion; through His indulgence, not through our own power. For, whatever virtue we call our own is itself bestowed upon us by His goodness.[14]

The procedure for validating ethical claims cannot be derivable from from the criteria of adequate religious adjustment; it is thus an independent discipline. *With a view to the methodological problems of ethical judgment then the religious selection of an ethical teaching or principle is quite arbitrary, no matter how fundamental that teaching may be for some particular religious revelation.* The status and the source of an ethical insight are two distinct issues.

In summary: the reductive views of Marx and Freud deny an ethically critical function to religious insight because it is for them pathological, and itself requires correction. But the seemingly powerful and convincing account of the religious problem offered by Professor Tillich—an account in sympathy with the central teachings of Luther and St. Augustine—would also appear (though this cannot be said to be his intention) to deny such a function to religion, precisely because its ultimate concern is incorrigible. In the one, religion is subordinate to ethical insight and in the other, beyond it. In the one, religion is subject to ethical adjustment and in the other it transcends ethical problems.

I have offered this analysis as an honest challenge to religiously oriented thinkers who insist that religion may not only inspire ethically advanced insights but, also, that the criteria of religious adequacy entail ethical criteria as well. I confess I cannot see how that is possible, once it is admitted that *ethics is concerned with the corrigibility of human conduct* (within existential limits) and *religion is concerned with the incorrigibility of existential anxiety regardless of one's ethical commitment;* that one is concerned to develop standards for judging finite conduct and the other is concerned to meet "the question implied in finitude" by some transfinite reference.

13. *Ibid.,* p. 197. Italics my own.

14. Saint Augustine, *The City of God,* I, translated by Marcus Dods (New York, 1948), 413. Italics my own.

El Popol-Vuh, Fuente Histórica. By Rafael Girard. Guatemala City: Editorial del Ministerio de Educación Pública, 1952. 460 pp., 104 text figs.

According to the scanty evidence available, the Popol-Vuh, commonly referred to as the sacred book of the Quiché Indians of Guatemala, was written from memory by an anonymous member of the Quiché tribe in the Quiché language, employing Roman letters, not long after the Spanish conquest of Guatemala. The manuscript was discovered early in the eighteenth century by the learned Dominican Father Francisco Ximénez in the monastery of Chichicastenango, the remote Quiché settlement to which he had been assigned as curate. Thoroughly competent in the Quiché language, Ximénez prepared a copy of the original with a parallel translation into Spanish. This was not published until 1857. Practically all authorities agree that the work represents the richest body of native American lore in existence. Several subsequent translations, either of the Quiché version or of Ximénez' Spanish text, have appeared—some with commentaries of variable merit.

Mr. Girard's study is not a new translation, but a complete exegesis of the Popol-Vuh. Relying on the most authoritative modern versions (those of Villacorta, Recinos, and Raynaud), he examines this extraordinary material in the light of other native books, the accounts of the Spanish chroniclers, the findings of the archeologists, the field studies of modern ethnologists (especially his own thirty odd years of intimate contact with the Chorti Indians of Guatemala, a modern Maya group), and the ecology of the Maya area (ethnobotany, ethnozoology, meteorological and astronomical data). The result is an amazing historical synthesis of the origin and growth of Maya-Quiché civilization. Because this civilization is richly permeated with a religious system which gave to the ancient inhabitants of Central America a lofty conception of the cosmos and divinity, a sense of man's integration with the rhythm of the universe, and a high code of ethics—at the same time banishing for them all fear of death and freeing them from most of the inner turmoil with which we are beset—it well merits the attention of the student of comparative religion.

For the uninitiated, any reference to the religion of either the ancient

Aztecs or the Mayas brings to mind pictures of bloody sacrifices and a confusing hodge-podge of weird deities, half animal and half human. As a matter of fact, even if one has studied the works of many of the specialists in this field, he may feel just as confused as before. The perplexing phenomena of multiple representations of the same deity, different deities with overlapping functions, bisexual gods; world directions now associated with one set of colors, now with another; an underworld called by some students "hell" and by others considered a special kind of "heaven"—all these remain as obscure as ever. If, however, we accept Girard's interpretations and arguments (and we must concede that he makes a strong case), a firm thread of coherence and consistency emerges.

He does not, of course, ask us to take the Four Ages of the Popol-Vuh literally, that is, as actual history. He does insist, however, that the Quiché myths are symbolic representations of episodes which did in fact occur. In the First Age we have the picture of groups of nomadic hunters and food-gatherers, each speaking a different dialect, living in the Pacific region of Guatemala, equipped with neither blowgun nor bow and arrow, and knowing neither pottery nor weaving. Eking out a precarious existence, they live in caves, burrows and ravines, abandon their dead without burial, practice no magic, engage in no warfare, reckon descent in the male line, and believe in only one god, the Creator of the world (who, however, seems endowed with both male and female attributes).

With the Second Age come far-reaching social changes which reflect changes in the economy. It is an age of horticulture and pottery. New tools and implements are invented. Woman adopts the digging stick and begins to grind edible roots on stone and wooden mortars. Ropes are invented, and knotted ropes serve as mnemonic devices. The properties of latex are discovered, upon which were to depend the making of rubber balls and the invention of the sacred ball game. Village groups arise, and although they are governed by men, it is the women who begin to assume greater social importance by virtue of their role as providers of food. Matriliny gradually replaces patriliny as the pattern of descent. Meanwhile ethnic fusion occurs, and the people come to speak a common language.

It is also in the Second Age that the first gropings toward a cosmogony are made. The universe is conceived as a gigantic four-sided plane,

whose corners become the foci of specialized manifestations of the divine and take on the aspect of new deities. These four corners do not, as Girard makes very evident (despite the widespread belief of ethnologists to the contrary), correspond to the four cardinal points; they are the points on the horizon where the sun sets and rises on the dates of the solstices. When, in the next Age, astronomical observations will extend to the passage of the sun through the zenith along a line which seems to divide the universe into equal halves, the two extremities of this line and the position of the sun when directly overhead will be added to the four corners to form the Divine Septemvirate. The Septemvirate, though designated by seven separate names, does not—Girard insists—signify a pantheon of seven gods, but rather a single god with seven manifestations.

This theme of many gods in one, a single deity polymorphous and polynomial, is extensively developed in Girard's thesis. Out of his own substance the Creator god engenders other gods, who, in a mystical sense, remain part of the One. This is Girard's explanation of the meaning of representations in the codices and on the monuments of gods lacking a foot, a hand, or some other anatomical part.

More particularized religious manifestations develop in the Second Age. The dog acquires religious significance. The rite of confession is inaugurated, as well as that of tearful farewell. The dead are buried with their possessions, and food offerings are made to them. Ritual includes the use of rattles and the burning of tobacco (so that its smoke, by imitative magic, will induce cloud formation and bring rain). For the first time human sacrifice appears, the victims being decapitated and quartered, and with this practice there is ritual cannibalism. In keeping with the growing social dominance of woman in this period, Ixmucané, the moon-earth goddess, mother of cultivated plants, assumes special importance. Reflecting the composite monotheism of the cosmic plane, we now have in the mundane sphere a council of chiefs, who are also priests and sacrificers. War is waged against alien groups, and prisoners receive cruel treatment.

The Third Age brings marked progress, both material and spiritual. Turkeys are domesticated, the usefulness of cacao is discovered, and corn (maize) as a food source is experimented with by the women, who produce one crop a year. The great food staple of the time, however, is the bean, which, as Girard shows, probably originated in Guatemala.

Substantial houses, with roof gutters, are built. The now thoroughly preponderant role of women in food production has freed the men to develop their talents in such pursuits as song, oratory, ritual dancing, drawing, painting and sculpture. The famous calendar is taking form. True temples are built, and altar tables are fashioned, their tops symbolizing the cosmic plane and their sacred vases, specifically placed, representing astro-theogonic entities as they do today on Chorti altars. Human sacrifice is now reserved for children, and the torture of prisoners is reduced to plaguing them with ants or thorns.

With the Fourth Age the Quichés feel that they emerge completely from the dark days of barbarism into the full brilliance of civilization. The respective roles of men and women are to a great extent transposed. Men cultivate the maize (two crops a year, instead of one only), and maize replaces the bean as *the* food of the people. Curiously enough, the Chorti word for bean is feminine, while that for maize is masculine. A god, not a goddess, presides over the new food plant. In the statuary female figures give way to male representations. The clan, an institution of earlier matriarchal days, becomes subservient to the tribe, the closest American Indian approximation to our concept of the state.

With the invention of the zero (at least a millennium ahead of the Hindus), mathematics, astronomy, and calendric knowledge make vast strides, culminating in the greatest of Maya-Quiché intellectual achievements, the luni-solar, Long Count system of reckoning time, a system which can distinguish any given day from another within a period of 370,000 years! Girard argues quite convincingly that the true purpose of this calendar was to ensure the continuity of the universe, thus liberating the Mayas from a fear which obsessed the Aztecs, the fear that at the end of any 52-year cycle the world might be destroyed, reinstating the primordial chaos which preceded the first creation.

In the Fourth Age the religious system purges itself completely of the barbaric practice of human sacrifice, a practice which had been imposed on the people from alien Nahua sources. Henceforth, only plants and animals will be sacrificed. War is now resorted to only as a measure of defense against attack from without, and prisoners, instead of being killed or tortured, are made vassals of the conqueror. Drunkenness, laziness, and vanity are denounced as vices. Cultivation of the *milpa* becomes a religious duty. Self-help, pacifism, altruism, social justice,

respect for others, love of truth, gratitude to both man and God—these are the new ideals by which the people live, and crime is non-existent. Under the leadership of a theocratic government, great religious centers, with pyramids and ball courts, are set up. (Incidentally, for Girard, the pyramid has its prototype in the mound of earth piled around the base of the cornstalk to protect and nourish the plant—a novel explanation which seems not out of place in a civilization based on maize.) Many of the cruder religious manifestations of an earlier age disappear. Ritual dances and plays in the form of religious allegories lend color and meaning to the life of the common man. Baptism with water comes into vogue, and copal incense, replacing tobacco smoke, figures prominently in the ceremonies. A well integrated and smoothly operating culture is now in full bloom.

No doubt the extent to which one may subscribe to Girard's vast historical reconstruction will long remain a matter of controversy. The use of myths for historical inferences has been a moot question in anthropology for years, with its opponents generally in the majority. However, the opposition has received some jolts in recent years with the demonstration by paleontologists that myths of the North American Indians which point to an acquaintance with the mastodon and other extinct fauna are not incompatible with the facts. (See, for example, "Men and Elephants in America," by Ludwell H. Johnson, III, in *The Scientific Monthly,* October, 1952.) This reviewer finds it difficult to accept without reservations such intangible matters as family organization, mode of reckoning descent, or the presence or absence of animism and magic on the earliest Maya-Quiché cultural horizon. However plausible the inferences, these are matters beyond the reach of scientific enquiry. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether any author has ever crammed so much information on the development of Middle American civilization between two covers or made more skillful use of his data. His superb analysis of the sacred ball game and penetrating interpretation of the Volador performance, to cite but two of his innumerable instances of extraordinary insight into phenomena of the ancient culture, many of which survive today, make the book a veritable treasure chest for the student of any or all phases of this fascinating field.

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Peekskill, New York

Religion in an African City. By GEOFFREY PARRINDER. New York: Oxford University Press, 1953. 211 pp. $3.00.

This study embodies the results of researches carried out by the author for an undisclosed length of time during the period 1949-51 in the city of Ibadan in Nigeria. Practically all studies of West African religion up to now have been made either by anthropologists anxious to study the indigenous religion in areas relatively undisturbed by outside contacts, or by missionaries describing the failures or successes of their evangelical efforts with little awareness of the general factors which might account for the outcome of their endeavors.

Ibadan, with a population variously estimated at 300,000 to 400,000, is the largest urban agglomeration south of the Sahara and outside of the Union of South Africa. It is a center of the important Yoruba-speaking peoples who occupy most of the southwestern part of Nigeria. Two other recent brief studies have appeared in the periodical literature treating of the religious situation in the Yoruba cities of Lagos (Comhaire) and Oshogbo (Schwab).[1] The picture that emerges for these cities as well as Ibadan is broadly similar. The indigenous religion is in a fairly advanced state of decline, being confined chiefly to the older generation. On the other hand, many of the characteristic ideas of African religious life tend to continue under the facade of Islam or Christianity (i.e., witchcraft, divination, magic). Of the two great non-indigenous systems, it is Islam which everywhere seems to be making the greater headway. In addition to the standard Christian denominations, separatist churches, as well as those of African origin influenced to a greater or lesser degree by standard Christian doctrines, form a not inconsiderable portion of the Christian community. Thus, for Ibadan Parrinder estimates the membership of the various separatist and nativistic Christian groups as one-fifth of the entire Christian population.

The present work strives to encompass the whole variety of religious life in Ibadan. There are chapters on aboriginal religion, Islam, orthodox and non-orthodox Christianity, as well as sections on topics directly connected with the relative lack of success of Christian efforts

1. Both of these articles appeared in Zaïre, Comhaire's in 1949 (May) and Schwab's in 1952 (October).

in Ibadan, but the length of the book is inadequate for a really thorough examination of all of these aspects. Thus, the interesting section on African Christian sects, about which we know so little, hardly does more than arouse the reader's curiosity for more detailed knowledge.

There are observations of interest scattered through the book, and Parrinder is a keen and reasonably detached observer. He notes, for example, that contrary to the general impression, most of the secessions from Christian churches have not been on the issue of polygamy, although, in fact, all African churches permit it for the laity at least. He remarks, likewise, that the Yoruba are not as confused or dismayed about the variety of Christian denominations as one might expect, since aboriginal Yoruba religion consisted of a number of independent cult groups, each with its own priesthood and shrine. In this connection, it is worth noting that those few Yoruba observances which have a significance wider than these dwindling cult groups tend to survive and assume a new meaning as an expression of local or national solidarity. The annual festivals of the patron goddess Oshun of Oshogbo, described by Schwab, and the celebration in honor of Oke 'badan, the traditional founder of Ibadan, as described in the present work, have become general holidays in which Muslims and Christians, as well as adherents of traditional Yoruba religion, participate. Another noteworthy survival is the elaborate divination cult of Ifa, historically related to the geomancy of the Near East and of medieval Europe. Indeed, one of the syncretistic churches, "The Holy Ethiopian Community Church," considers the Bible, the Koran, and Ifa equally sacred.

These few indications may serve to illustrate the richness and complexity of the religious life of the contemporary Yoruba, to which the present work furnishes an excellent introduction. A more profound study than the one under review would necessarily take into greater account the general social and cultural background and the vast and rapid changes which the Yoruba are at present undergoing under the impact of contact with the West. It is to be hoped that Mr. Parrinder or others connected with the University College at Ibadan can take advantage of their unique opportunity to carry out such a full study in the future.

Joseph H. Greenberg

Columbia University

The Sword from the Rock: an Investigation into the Origins of Epic Literature and the Development of the Hero. By G. R. Levy. London: Faber and Faber. 236 pp. 30*s.*

This volume continues the comprehensive history commenced in the author's *The Gate of Horn: A Study of the Religious Conceptions of the Stone Age, and Their Influence upon European Thought.* In her earlier work, Miss Levy's sweeping review of mankind's spiritual development was carried, from its paleolithic beginnings in "the recognition of a single life-giving principle conserved in the changeless stability of the cave" (p. 83), through the crisis of a neolithic recognition of "movement in time"—which "could not . . . be intelligibly apprehended until the reaping of wild corn was replaced by the punctual recurrence of seed-time and harvest" (p. 83)—on to the great climax of "the Hellenic religious inheritance . . . shaped to the needs of a people emotionally mature" (p. 300). In the present volume, turning back in her opening chapters to the second millennium B.C., Miss Levy treats first of the seasonal rites of the Bronze Age—"a whole body of ceremonial, which in its local variations appears to have been fundamental to the structure of almost every great kingdom of the prehellenic East"—and then attempts to show that

> this ritual, which maintained the political stability of the states during the centuries of migration of peoples who were eventually to dispossess them, became the formal source and earliest centre of dispersal of the first two categories of epic literature . . . and contained the seed from which the third type developed its independent existence among the new nations (p. 26).

Miss Levy's three categories of epic literature are: *Type A,* epics related to the establishment of world-order by the gods in conflict with the progeny of chaos (e.g., the Mesopotamian Epic of Creation); *Type B,* epics related to a search, or voyage of discovery (the Mesopotamian Gilgamesh Epic, and the Aryan Odyssey and Rāmāyana); and *Type C,* epics related to heroic warfare, in which the antagonists are men, often kinsmen (the Aryan Iliad and Mahābhārata).

It is Miss Levy's belief that the factor of strife, which she regards as characteristic of the epic, first appears in the Akkadian version of the Mesopotamian Epic of Creation. In the earlier, Sumerian, cosmogonic poems, she declares,

there is no conflict or sacrifice as a preliminary to the creation of man. . . . It is the introduction of the dragon which causes that strife with its promise of perpetual renewal (since these monsters, like the dragon of the Apocalypse, were bound but not slain). And with the dragon arises the power of the hero (as yet a god only, but a god capable of death, and therefore on the way to manhood) which opens the road to epic (p. 47).

"The subject of this book," she writes in her Introduction, "is the struggle between human and divine in the person of the god-descended hero during the process of reaching full humanity; that is, freedom, circumscribed by 'fate and his own transgression' " (p. 13).

Miss Levy's argument is rendered by means of synopses of the above named epics, with a final chapter on "The European Inheritance," in which brief discussions are to be found of (1) the *Aeneid* and *Paradise Lost;* (2) *Beowulf* and the Icelandic *Eddas* and *Sagas;* (3) the *Song of Roland;* (4) Malory's *Morte d'Arthur;* and (5) T. E. Lawrence's *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom.*

The title of the book is meant to suggest something of the vast continuity that Miss Levy thinks she perceives in the evolution of the Indo-European concept of the epic hero. Accordingly, she opens her first chapter with a description of the Hittite cave-sanctuary of Yasilikaya, where an Aryan king is depicted, being conducted by a divine guide into the presence of an awesome sword-god. Miss Levy associates this relief, by means of "an aesthetic deduction supported by very fragmentary archaeological evidence" (p. 35, n. 1), with the Mesopotamian ceremonies of cyclic renewal, and then, by means, in part, of further aesthetic deductions, threads her lofty, precarious way to a brief mention of the swords of Arthur and Galahad (Theseus and Odin in a footnote) just three paragraphs before her arrival at *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom.* Taken for granted is a hypothesis of human (and, more specifically, Aryan) socio-psychological evolution that is not supported by the presented evidence.

Moreover, much of the material proper to the subject lies beyond Miss Levy's command. In her treatment, for example, of the Indian epics (which are largely synopsized from synopses) there is less scholarship than opinion, less understanding than arrogance. The view of the epic in Europe is patently superficial. And the prodigious omission of any reference of her Types A, B, and C to their precise counterparts in

the literatures (oral and written) of Africa, the non-Aryan Orient, and the Americas, leaves the whole problem about where it was at the end of the nineteenth century.

Nevertheless, the chapter on the Iliad is well felt; and this, coupled on the one hand with the final paean to T. E. Lawrence (who wrote a translation of the Iliad) and, on the other, with the touching dedication that opens *The Gate of Horn:* "To T. E. L. O lux Dardaniae . . . ," may gain for Miss Levy a place in the annals, if not of science, at least of English letters and of the human heart.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL

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Tibetan Religious Art. By ANTOINETTE K. GORDON. New York: Columbia University Press, 1952. ix, 104 pp. $10.00.

The announced purpose of this work is to explain Tibetan art to a wider public than was the case with the author's previous book, *The Iconography of Tibetan Lamaism* (New York, 1939). There is no claim to present a scholarly advance in the field of Tibetan iconography. A wide range of Tibetan art objects is represented in magnificent photographs, ninety-three in number, of which two are in full color, "Horoscope, or Astrological Diagram" and "Principal Events in the Life of the Budda." Both the interested layman and the specialized scholar will find these reproductions of value.

As a background for evaluating the text, this reviewer had recourse to two treatises in the complete works *(Gsuṅ ḥbum)* of the A-kya Hutukhtu.[1] Because of their relevance to the subject, they deserve a brief description:

1. Sec. Ja. *Sṅags kyi brtul źugs kyi yan lag ḥgaḥ źig ji ltar bya baḥi tshul bstan pa don gsal sgron* (24 fols.). This work sets forth various ritual objects, their varieties, forms, compositions, and uses, under the basic categories: (1) thunderbolts and bells; (2) drums and body ornaments; (3) *khaṭvāṅgas* and skull bowls; and (4) *deva*-flasks and (burnt-offering) ladles.

1. Peking block print in the uncatalogued Tibetan collection of the East Asiatic Library, University of California.

2. Sec. Za. *Cha tshad kyi bstan bcos mkhas paḥi ḥjug ṅogs* (19 fols.). This is a treatise on images *(sku brñan)*. The author discusses the treatment found in various texts, and describes the measurements under seven categories, first the two *rūpa-kāyas,* then the Saṃvara type, Bodhisattvas, etc. After that, he considers their meanings, uses, and so forth.

On the basis of this comparative study, Mrs. Gordon's textual material was seen to be, for the most part, an elementary survey of Western sources. The general accuracy is therefore limited by current knowledge of these subjects. Nevertheless, the book is an admirable introductory account for the general reader, and the author's own sympathy for the subject is well controlled and subordinated to lucid exposition.

With regard to symbolism, it will suffice to consider the explanation of the "Yab-yum" aspect, given on page 57. It is hardly tenable to consider the union of Vajradhara, or of Dhyani Buddha, and *shakti,* as a representation of uniting *upāya* (the means) and *prajñā* (wisdom). The *tantras* presume to set forth a quick path covering the same territory as the Bodhisattva Path, which comprises ten Stages *(bhūmi)* in correspondence with the *pāramitās* (Transcendental Virtues).[2] The union of *upāya* and *prajñā* is implicit in the seventh *pāramitā,* which is called *upāya-kauśalya* (skillful means), and which is predominant on the seventh Stage of the Bodhisattva Path, *Dūraṅgamā* (far-going). There are still ahead the eighth through tenth Stages. The Dhyani Buddhas cannot be placed beneath the tenth Stage, and the symbol Vajradhara pertains to the Buddha *bhūmi* beyond the tenth Stage. Mrs. Gordon cannot be censured for having shared a wide-spread misconception. Indeed, the proof of these remarks will only be seen in full force when Western translations are made of such works as Tsoṅ kha pa's reform of the *tantras,* the *Sṅags rim chen mo.* In the meantime, the work under review cannot be considered less reliable than other treatises in the field, while its manner of composition seems well suited to accomplishing the stated purpose.

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2. For this correspondence, cf. *The Bodhisattva Doctrine,* Har Dayal (London, 1932), pp. 284, ff.

The Holy Lake of the Acts of Rāma. A new translation of Tulasī Dās's *Rāmacaritamānasa.* By W. P. D. Hill. New York: Oxford University Press, 1953. xxxvii, 538 pp. $4.50.

There seems to be a new interest in the Epic of Rāma in both of its famous forms. Recently two sections of Vālmīki's *Rāmāyaṇa,* the Bālākāṇḍa and the Ayodhyākāṇḍa, have been published in an English translation by Hari Prasad Shastri, who, in his Introduction, remarks: "Truth, benevolence, mercy and righteousness are the faces of Light, which are opposed to greed, lust, love of pleasure, anger and egoism." This is a summary of what the message of the Epic means to Indians. Also, there is in press at the present time, in India, a metrical translation of the *Rāmāyaṇa* of Tulsī Dās by the Rev. A. G. Atkins. From this the first *Chhand* may be quoted, telling Tulsī's feeling of inadequacy in telling the story of Rāma:

> Sublime bliss bestowing, all evil o'erthrowing,
> Says Tulsī, tho' tortuous its going,
> The Lord Rāma's story is pure in its glory,
> Like some sacred river on-flowing.
> With his story blended, poor words are made splendid,
> The hearts of all good men delighting;
> As the ash of the dead, when on Śiva's limbs spread,
> Is made bright—with his glory uniting.

And now Mr. Hill has published his prose translation under the title, *The Holy Lake of the Acts of Rāma.*

For some seventy-five years now, English readers have been dependent upon F. S. Growse for Tulsī Dās's famous work, and the usefulness of Mr. Growse's translation is attested by the fact that a sixth edition of it was published at Allahabad in 1922. And it must not be forgotten that Mr. Growse was a capable writer to whom we are indebted for other works, especially for his beautifully illustrated *Mathurā, a District Memoir* (third edition, 1883).

In recent years a great deal of excellent editorial work has been done on Tulsī Dās's *Ramāyāṇa* by Indian scholars, so that Mr. Hill has had a much better text to work with than Mr. Growse had seventy-five years ago. And Mr. Hill's translation of the *Bhagavad Gītā* (1928) gives us confidence in the quality of his scholarship. Here he gives us a most readable and attractive English translation, as the following quotation shows:

May he in whose bosom shines glorious the daughter of the mountain and on whose head is the river of the gods; he on whose forehead lies the crescent moon; he on whose throat is the stain of poison, and on whose breast lies the Serpent King; ash-smeared, chiefest of the gods and lord of all, destroyer, all-pervading, auspicious, bright as the moon, the Lord Śaṁkara, ever protect me.

Following loosely the *Ramāyāṇa* of Vāḷmīki, Tulsī Dās's work is, to a large extent, a theological treatise, making uneven use of the chapters of that story. He works into his account a great deal of tradition and myth, with the element of the marvelous and wonders of all sorts often repeated. This gives the proper setting for the story of Rāma, especially since it is so lengthy and is intended for recitation in various settings, in the courts of rajas and by firelight in villages. It is the *hearing* of the story that has made it famous.

Mr. Hill's Introduction, with its analysis of the work, is a valuable aid to the English reader, and the Appendix contains concise notes on a wide range of topics, such as proper names and mythological subjects, so necessary for the average reader's understanding of the work. This translation ought to attract many new readers to one of India's most beloved sacred stories.

GEORGE W. BRIGGS

Drew University

Vivekananda: a Biography. By SWAMI NIKHILANANDA. New York: Ramakrishna-Vivekananda Center, 1953. viii, 216 pp. $3.50.

The background of Narendrenath Datta's life was poverty. About the time that he left college he met Ramakrishna, who recognized in him great possibilities. It was due to the Master's skill in handling him that "Naren" finally yielded to discipleship. "You are born for the Mother's (Kālī's) work. I also know that you will be a monk, but stay in the world as long as I am alive, for my sake at least" (p. 23). Later, when Naren complained that the Mother did not answer his prayers about the relief of his poverty, Ramakrishna said:

Today is Tuesday, an auspicious day for the Mother's worship. Go to her shrine in the evening, prostrate yourself before the image, and pray to her for any boon; it will be granted. Mother Kali is the embodiment of love and compassion. She is the power of Brahman. She gives birth to the world by Her mere wish. She fulfils every sincere prayer of Her devotees" (p. 23).

In the evening, at the temple, Naren saw that Ramakrishna, his master, intended him for the life of renunciation.

Fearful of excessive spiritual fervor, he was reminded by the master: "God is like an ocean of sweetness; wouldn't you dive into it? Suppose there is a bottle with a wide mouth, filled with syrup, and you were a fly, hungry for the sweet liquid. How would you like to drink it?" Narendra said that he would sit on the edge of the bottle, otherwise he might be drowned in the syrup and lose his life. The Master replied:

> But you must not forget that I am talking of the Ocean of Satchidananda, the Ocean of Immortality. Here one need not be afraid of death. Only fools say that one should have too much of divine ecstasy. Can anybody carry to excess the love of God? You must dive deep in the Ocean of God" (p. 25).

He finally surrendered to Ramakrishna.

Shortly before his death, Ramakrishna said to him: "O Naren, today I have given you everything I possess—now I am no more than a fakir, a penniless beggar. By the powers I have transmitted to you, you will accomplish great things in the world, and not until then will you return to the source whence you have come" (p. 34).

In those days the Ramakrishna Order came into being, the members taking new names suggesting renunciation, and also the title "Swami." Naren became Swami Vivekananda. The character of the order, with its serious object of service to their fellow men, was largely due to the Swami. He also set the stage for study out of which has come much literary work in centers in India and in America.

Swami Vivenkananda was always a great traveller, and he covered much of India, acquiring a growing sense of burden for the poverty of the mass of his countrymen. In one of his pilgrimages he reached the extreme southern tip of India, and, there, as he looked over the expanse of the sea, the thought of America filled his mind. This was coupled with the suggestion that he go to the forthcoming Parliament of Religions at Chicago. Indians, especially members of the Ramakrishna Order, have been justly proud of Swami Vivekananda's triumph in the West.

There is no question but that his qualities of mind, his gift of eloquence, and his bearing brought to him an unprecedented reception.

His words in cold print now lack something of the flaming effect that his impassioned lectures and addresses had. He had something new to say. He believed that the West needed the Vedanta, which India had to give, and that the fabulously rich West (America) had the alleviation of poverty to give to India. Here was exchange on a grand scale. Moreover, he indulged in no attacks on other religions. His was the positive approach of giving. Reading this *Biography,* one feels that the Vedanta which he preached was not quite the non-duality which the term implies. There are many references to the Mother as personal.

It is common knowledge that he took America by storm, and that he made many friends, some with ample means. This has contributed to the success of the Mission since that time. In Europe he had something of the same success. Some of his disciples gave years of devoted service to India. The most notable of these was Miss Margaret Noble (Nivedita, "Dedicated"). His reception upon his return to India was spectacular all the way from Bombay to Calcutta. Had he not brought India to the forefront of the world of religion and thought? He made another pilgrimage to the West, but his fame rests upon the first journey.

If his making the West aware of the heritage of India was his first great achievement, the second was his founding of the Ramakrishna Mission. This stands practically alone in Hinduism as a concerted welfare undertaking. Never getting out from under the burden of his country's poverty, disease, and need for instruction, he organized what has become a distinctive institution for service.

> To his brother disciples, therefore, he pointed out that the idea of personal liberation was unworthy of those who called themselves disciples of Ramakrishna, an incarnation of God. The very fact that they had received the grace of a Savior should have convinced them of their sure salvation. Their duty, he emphasized, was to serve others as the visible manifestations of God. He said that he wanted to create a new band of monks, who would take not only the traditional vow of personal salvation, but also a new vow of service to humanity (p. 123).

In the body of the *Biography* are numerous interesting discussions, notably, Vedanta in America, At Thousand Islands Park (where the Ramakrishna Mission now has an establishment), The Company of Some Notables (including Tesla, Lord Kelvin, Helmholtz, Sarah Bernhardt, Madame Calvé, the Hales, and Miss Noble).

He was not slow to see through situations. To a question put to him in Italy after seeing High Mass at St. Peter's on Christmas Day, he replied: "Why all this pagentry and ostentatious show? Can it be possible that the Church which loves such a display of pomp and ceremonies is the true follower of the humble Jesus, who had nowhere to lay his head?" (p. 111).

There are many passages like the following, that might be quoted as explaining Swami Vivekananda's views:

> The beliefs that Narendra had learnt on his mother's lap had been shattered by a college education, but the young man now came to know that Hinduism does not consist of dogmas or creeds; it is an inner experience, deep and inclusive, which respects all faiths, all thoughts, all efforts, and all realizations. Unity in diversity is its ideal" (p. 27).

In the final session of the Parliament, he said:

> The Christian is not to become a Hindu or a Buddhist, nor is a Hindu or a Buddhist to become a Christian. But each must assimilate the spirit of the others and yet preserve his own individuality and grow according to his own law of growth. If the Parliament has shown anything to the world, it is this: It has proved to the world that holiness, purity and charity are not the exclusive possessions of any church in the world, and that every system has produced men and women of the most exalted character. In the face of this evidence, if anybody dreams of the exclusive survival of his own religion and the destruction of the others, I pity him from the bottom of my heart and point out to him that upon the banner of every religion will soon be written, in spite of resistance: "Help and not Fight," "Assimilation and not Destruction," "Harmony and Peace and not Dissension."
>
> By the Vedas he did not mean any particular book containing the words of a prophet or deriving sanction from any supernatural authority, but the accumulated treasure of spiritual laws discovered by various Indian seers in different times (pp. 62f.)

Swami Vivekananda died at the age of thirty-nine, after some years of suffering, his death hastened by his overpowering desire to teach, to lecture, and to travel.

This is a full-length Indian portrait of one of the most distinguished religious figures of sixty years ago. Having access to all the documentary materials, speeches, letters, and reports of the press at his command, Swami Nikhilananda has given a thoroughly intimate and comprehensive study of the man. It is restrained, but enthusiastic and straightfor-

ward, which makes the volume of special value to students and scholars. The organization is simple, followed by an appendix containing characteristic sayings of Vivekananda carefully classified.

GEORGE W. BRIGGS

Drew University

The Sacred Scriptures of the Japanese. By POST WHEELER. New York: Henry Schuman, Inc., 1952. xlvi, 562 pp. $10.00.

The first American career diplomat who has passed through all the diplomatic grades to special ambassadorship, and a triple doctorate degree holder from Princeton, Temple, and the Andhra Research Universities has written a book entitled *The Sacred Scriptures of the Japanese.* It took him twenty years to complete it. According to this eminent diplomat scholar, the book constitutes "by and large, the only complete and critical presentation of a sacred myth which has had an almost unbelievable influence upon 140,000,000 people and which represents one of the most important mythopoeic creations of mankind," and it includes "all authoritative variants, chronologically arranged, setting forth the narrative of the Creation of the Cosmos, the Divine Descent of the Sky-Ancestor of the Imperial House and the lineage of the Earthly Emperors, to whom the Sun Deity has given the rule of the world unto ages eternal."

The conception of the work came very early to the author, and it traveled with him not only the entire breadth and length of Japan during his three-term official sojourn, but also all over the world, so as to make him an authority on the legends of areas as wide apart as Russia, Hawaii, Arabia, and Ethiopia. This attempt at rewriting the mythology of ancient Japan was based on the painstaking and exhaustive scrutiny of such native sources as the *Fudoki* (Topographical Records, A.D. 713 and onward), the *Kojiki* (Records of Ancient Matters, A.D. 712), the *Nihongi* (Chronicles of Japan, A.D. 720), the *Kogo-Shûi* (Gleanings from Ancient Stories, A.D. 806), the *Shôjiroku* (Record of Family Names, A.D. 815) and the *Engi-Shiki* (Institutes of the Engi Era, A.D. 927), including the *Kujiki* (Account of Ancient Things, of uncertain date), with free consultation with native authorities such as the late Drs. K. Kurita, Y. Haga, and M. Anesaki. To all intents and purposes the work represents stupendous toil and unusual scholarship.

Three comments are to be made, not without a certain sense of trepidation. The first is that the author still seems to carry a vivid impression of Japan as the nation of manifest destiny in the Far East which harks back to the time when Japan had emerged militant and triumphant from the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese Wars. It was the time when Japan, as Dr. E. Herbert Norman says, was emerging as a modern power. The present day Japan appears rather hesitant to carry even her share of defense before the advance of communism. The second is that the author is still relying on the scholarship of the eighteenth century Neo-Shintoist scholars, headed by Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801). Chamberlain and Aston relied on Motoori as their main authority when they made the translations of *Kojiki* and *Nihongi*, respectively. Since Motoori's time, however, new light has been cast upon the study of antiquity of Japan, not only by the advancement of anthropological and archeological studies, but by the combined studies with continental culture in general, and Chinese in particular. But Motoori's effort was to disengage, disentangle things Japanese from things Chinese, as best he could. If I am not mistaken, Dr. Wheeler, with his enormous acquaintance with the mythology of the world, seems to be trying to explain Japanese myth as independent of Chinese, except on sparse occasions. The third is that the entire legend of Japan as seen in the sources above-mentioned cannot be discussed adequately without closely referring to the Chinese prototypes. As a matter of historical fact, all sources upon which Dr. Wheeler has based his reconstruction of the mythology were the compilations made under the instigation and tutelage of Chinese civilization and culture then dominating the Far East.

The last section of the book consists of an Analysis of the Narrative: I. Myth Parallels; II. Primeval Cults, subdivided (1) The Cult of the Sun, (2) The Cult of the Sword, (3) The Cult of the Phallus, (4) The Cult of the Serpent, (5) Tree Worship, (6) Living Entombment and Human Sacrifice, (7) Matriarchy; III. Western Elements; IV. Southern Elements, and V. Local (Aboriginal) Elements, ending with VI. The Rationale of the Narrative. It will help Western students of Japanese antiquity in going through the labrinth of a mythology of multiple origin.

RYUSAKU TSUNODA

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The Origin and Development of Early Christian Church Architecture. By J. G. Davies. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. xiii, 152 pp. 16 pls., 45 plans and drawings in text. $4.75.

Although this book purports to present "new theories based on fresh discoveries," it uses, from the wealth of highly important studies appearing in recent years, but one minor source as late as 1949 and seven from 1947, while the vast majority of authorities quoted approvingly by its author belong to the generation of Diehl, Millet, and Strzygowski. This, perhaps, is no accident, since Davies' ideas on the origin and development of Christian architecture are as traditional and out-of-date as his sources, and his approach to most of the problems involved in this very controversial field are as superficial as they are dogmatic. This does not mean that his study is entirely worthless, since it assembles many pertinent references from classic and patristic writers, and its final chapters, "The Orientation and Furniture of the Church," "Adjoining Buildings," and "The Geographical Distribution," at least fill the role of brief but useful summaries. It is the first three, the most important chapters, which are so misleading.

The bias of the author appears at the outset in his discussion of "The Geographical and Historical Background," where he assumes a priori that the eastern provinces of the Roman Empire and those countries first Christianized beyond its borders, nourished art centers of sufficient vigor and originality to influence the entire subsequent artistic development. Yet he hastens to admit that, "before the time of Constantine, it is impossible to speak of Palestine being Christianized," and that only after the Peace of the Church did it begin to exert real influence. Likewise in Syria, although the Faith had gained a foothold there in the late first century and "several churches" existed in Antioch by 320, the extremely conservative nature of Syrian art, its retarded Hellenistic architectural style and its delayed adoption of Roman illusionism in the Antioch mosaics belie the assumption that "from Syria came the inspiration for Ravennate art." In 1936 Zaloziecky demonstrated the Western derivation of Ravennate architecture, and the present reviewer has since strengthened that thesis. Equally unfounded are the assertions—here merely parroted from Strzygowski—that the Aramaeans of Edessa, Nisibis, etc., "played a leading part in the development of Christian art," creating the orientalized Syrian-Hellenistic style which

eventually developed into Byzantine. Having stressed the now discounted importance of Asia Minor and Armenia, the author turns to Constantinople and the "flood of influences from the hinterland of Asia Minor and of Syria which descended upon it," as postulated by the old "oriental renaissance theory." Yet, here again, he has to make the damaging admission that "several centuries before the New Rome reached its zenith, Old Rome had been the primary focus of the Christian faith." As a final remark on this chapter we note that the author completely disregards the important Italian discoveries at Lepcis Magna and other African sites when he states that, "despite its commercial connexions with Rome, North Africa drew most of its architectural inspiration from the East, quite possibly via Egypt."

In the second chapter, "The Basilica," we find the same sort of implicit contradiction. Although assured that the West lagged behind the East in the evangelization of pagans, we learn, two pages later, that Tertullian vouches for second century church buildings in the West, and that *more than forty basilicas* existed in Rome at the beginning of the fourth century—when, as mentioned above, "several" are recorded at Antioch! An adequate discussion of the theories of origin of the Christian basilica follows, approving the now generally accepted thesis advanced by Leroux, and the four regional types of the early basilican church are illustrated in well known examples. But the author's usual disregard for current publications is evidenced, however, by references to Lowrie's *Christian Art* (1901) rather than to his *Art in the Early Church* (1947), by his plan of the Telesterion at Samothrace with interior columns where none ever existed, and particularly by his approval of Strzygowski's theory that the arcuated colonnade, originating in Iran, came via Mesopotamia to Antioch, and thence to its "probably earliest" Western example at Spalato. Davies, apparently, is quite unaware of the arcuated colonnades at Pompeii in the first century, of the monumental use of this feature in Hadrian's Villa at Tivoli before A.D. 135, and of its magnificent appearance at Lepcis Magna a full century before the reign of Diocletian.

Davies' third chapter, "The Central Type of Architecture," is so packed with bias, out-dated theories and downright error that a review within restricted limits can touch only on its most glaring lapses. For example: There is no evidence whatever for the existence of the true masonry dome in ancient Mesopotamia or Egypt, so that the dome of

the Roman Pantheon had no precursors in the East, and its plan (A.D. 120) could not have been influenced by the Marneion at Gaza (A.D. 130), with its domical wooden roof. Although, in discussing the central type in Syria, Davies thinks "it seems likely" that the church at Mir'ayeh "had originally a dome of mud-brick," and although he notes that St. George at Zo'rah *now* has a tall sugar-loaf dome, he is unaware that, for both these churches, Smith (*The Dome,* 1950) has demonstrated the existence of an original domical roof of wood, with a similar covering for the central octagon at Kal'at Sim'an. To account for the remarkable plan and structure of S. Vitale at Ravenna, the author naturally adopts the old "niche-buttress theory" of Strzygowski, which was based on late sixth and seventh century examples in Armenia. Yet he admits that the much finer Minerva Medica at Rome (misdated by Davies—actually 310-320) had closely approximated the structural system of S. Vitale two centuries before the Armenian types developed, and he "tentatively suggests" that the system was "devised by an architect of genius, possibly of Syrian origin." He asserts that the same conclusions hold true for Sts. Sergius and Bacchus at Constantinople, whose dome, he mistakenly thinks, is carried on squinches, since "its affinities with S. Vitale and with the Eastern type as at Zo'rah are sufficiently obvious"!

As a sequel to such errors little can be expected of Davies' account of the origin of the pendentive, the dome on pendentives, and the domed basilica. All his ideas stem from Millet, Strzygowski, and the old orientalizing hypotheses, whose unfounded theories and habitual perversion of fact have been signalized by the present reviewer in another context. This also holds true of Davies' remarks on churches with cruciform plans, the origin of which he traces to rock-cut tombs of late pagan and early Christian date in the East. Here again, however, he remains blind to the fact that cruciform tombs were frequently built by the Etruscans from the seventh century B.C. onward, and that these Etruscan plans, inherited by the Romans, were used in well-known examples in Italy, at Rome, Cassino, and elsewhere. He has, thus, no basis for asserting that "In the West the free-standing cross only appeared where oriental influences were predominant, as at Ravenna in the mausoleum of Galla Placidia."

To summarize this book, generally well illustrated but too often marred by crudely drawn and inaccurate plans, it may be said that the

average reader, who clings, perhaps, to the old orientalizing ideas of Christian architecture as expounded at the turn of the century, will find it quite satisfactory. Those better informed, however, must in all charity assume that they here have to do with a work prepared some decades ago and now published with only minor revisions.

EMERSON H. SWIFT

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The English Primers (1529-1545); Their Publication and Connection with the English Bible and the Reformation in England. By CHARLES C. BUTTERWORTH. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1953. xiii, 340 pp. $6.00.

During the early Tudor period, the increasing availability of the printed book and the concomitant growth of literacy greatly expanded the lay reading audience, an audience of middle-class and some common folk: shop-keepers, apprentices, farmers, servants in wealthy households. These readers demanded books in the vernacular, particularly books of solid value providing practical, moral, and religious instruction. The publications which issued from the presses in response to this demand are precious to collectors, since many of them were worn out completely by intensive use and some editions survive only in single, mutilated exemplars. Despite their value as rarities, historians of politics, social customs, literature, and religion have, with a few notable exceptions, ignored them.

From this obscurity, Dr. Butterworth, in the present volume, and Helen C. White, in her recent *The Tudor Books of Private Devotion* (University of Wisconsin, 1951), rescue the English Primers, a kind of compilation which bridges the gap between the ancient *Book of Hours* and the *Book of Common Prayer,* and thus illustrates the transition in the ways of private prayer from pre-Reformation days to the establishment of the Anglican Church. Like the *Book of Hours,* the Primers consist essentially of abbreviated versions of the regular offices of the Church, and in addition include an almanac; a calendar of saints' days; the Paternoster, Creed, and the Ten Commandments; and various

psalms, prayers, expositions, and moral treatises. Like the *Book of Common Prayer,* they are in English, designed for the use of the layman.

Whether the Primer was so called from the Hour of Prime or from the fact that it was the first or most important book *(liber primarius)* in many households remains uncertain. It was often the first book, too, in the sense that children and illiterates were taught to read from it (some of the Primers include alphabets and addresses to children) which accounts for the modern use of *primer* to designate an elementary reader.

The history of the English Primers coincides with the history of the critical years in the establishment of the Anglican Church. The earliest of them clearly reflects the struggle. It is the recently discovered *Ortulus anime. The garden of the soule: or the englisshe primers . . . newe corrected and augmented,* printed in 1530. As the title suggests, there must have been an earlier edition, probably in 1529. The compiler, Dr. Butterworth ingeniously argues, was George Joye, Protestant controversialist and, for a time, friend and collaborator of Tyndale. His Protestant conviction is revealed not only in his selection of matter (he omits the Litany) but also in such asides as his curious interpretation of the word *relic* as used in Relic Sunday, the Sunday following the feast of St. Thomas of Canterbury: "If ye childrene of Israel were as many in nowmbre as the sandes of the see: yet shall there be saued but theire reliquyes that is to saye but very fewe . . ." The book was promptly suppressed by the authorities, and the 1530 edition was published anonymously and surreptitiously. For the mere possession of Joye's Primer and similar books, Englishmen were called before investigating committees to abjure their heresies or to suffer death by fire.

The *Ortulus* was succeeded by a host of new Primers, each reflecting its editor's religious attitude and the rapidly changing political atmosphere. Finally, in 1545, a Primer was published "set foorth by the Kinges maiestie and his Clergie to be taught lerned & red: and none other to be vsed throughout all his dominions." This "authorized" Primer, like the authorized Latin grammar and the authorized English Bible of the same period, represents Henry VIII's partly successful attempt to force the teaching of letters and religion into a mold uniform for the nation.

The history of the English Primers is related also to the history of translations of the Bible into the vernacular. The Primers consist in

large part of familiar scriptural passages, including many of the Psalms. They were published at a time when Englishmen had not yet come to think of any vernacular version of the biblical text as standard. The translations of passages from the Scriptures to be found in them differ, sometimes widely, from the Tyndale and Coverdale renderings. To the intricate relationships among the various Primers and the published English Bibles in the interpretation, phraseology, and sentence rhythms of these passages Dr. Butterworth pays particular attention; it is a matter which, as he says, "emerges as the dominant theme of this work." Nevertheless, the extent to which the Primer translations influenced the wording of the Great Bible and its successors remains, despite his researches, difficult to estimate. The historian of the English translation of the Bible must depend upon printed sources, but, for the familiar passages especially, there must have been a vigorous oral tradition which it is now impossible to recapture. Innumerable preachers had expounded those passages in the vernacular, both before and after the time of Wyclif and Purvey. In translating such passages, the compiler of a Primer may have worked from earlier Primers and Psalters spread out on the table before him, choosing this phrase and altering that in accordance with his religious convictions and his literary taste. Dr. Butterworth appears to assume a process of this kind, but it is also possible that the compiler echoed, consciously or not, the translations that he had heard from the pulpit. The extraordinary variety of translations of the Lord's Prayer current during this period argues the latter hypothesis, it seems to me. In a useful Appendix Dr. Butterworth catalogues some dozen forms of the Prayer; he does not notice that within the compass of a few pages of the widely popular *Kalender of Shepherdes* (first published 1503) it is translated in four different ways, none of them corresponding to any in his list. Evidently, a study of the translations of the Paternoster to be found in the Primers can throw only indirect light upon the text of Standard Version.

Dr. Butterworth's scholarly and judicious investigation of the complicated history of the English Primers makes his book a valuable aid to the close student of the social and religious climate of the early days of the Reformation.

William Nelson

Columbia University

Philosemitismus im Barock: Religions- und geistesgeschichtliche Untersuchungen. By Hans Joachim Schoeps. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1952. viii, 216 pp.

This work by Hans Joachim Schoeps, who spent the years of the Hitler period in Sweden and is now professor of history of religion in Erlangen, presents the results of extensive researches on little-cultivated and, in some instances, entirely unknown relations of religious history and the history of ideas during the seventeenth century. This *"Barockzeitalter"* and its ideological background is still a stepchild of *Geistesgeschichte.* Consequently, the rich and manifold materials gathered in this volume, related to the study of Jewish religion and history and originating with Christians, Jews, and converts, will arouse the interest of theologians as well as historians from various points of view. For, in that century between the periods of the Reformation and Enlightenment, Orthodoxy and Pietism, world history took on, for the first time, a definitely modern character when man adopted a new approach towards understanding himself and interpreting world affairs. As the author discloses in his Preface, this transformation is studied by means of the scrutiny of a specific problem, the changed attitudes towards Judaism, with special emphasis on the Jewish messianic movements of the period.

The title of the book thus implies a change, even if only sporadic, in the attitude of the Christian world toward Jews and Judaism, from general anti-Jewish feelings (the modern term "anti-Semitism" would be anachronistic) to what the author describes as *Philosemitismus.* In his introductory remarks he even attempts to offer a definition of this term and to distinguish five different types of philosemitism "from antiquity to the present." Naturally, such a classification covering thousands of years is liable to be hazardous. The antithesis *adversus Judaeos* and *pro Judaeis,* applied to the pertinent controversial literature, would seem more sensible and better applicable for the purpose of the volume under review. For the most part it is devoted to bio-bibliographical, ergographical, and bibliographical studies. Hence, its title is a misnomer, from which one could hardly guess its actual contents.

Schoeps's work is divided into four parts, each of which consists of several more or less independent sections.

The first is devoted to the "philosemites" of the seventeenth century. They are Isaac de la Peyrère (1596-1676), French Calvinist and later Catholic of Bordeaux, who became famous all over Europe through his theory and writings on the *Prae-Adamitae,* propounding the existence of human beings even before Adam, which he tried to demonstrate on the basis of the Bible, and which he attempted to use, among other things, as an explanation of the origin of the American Indians; Paul Felgenhauer (1593-ca.1677), Bohemian-born author of more than seventy, for the most part chiliastic, writings, among them *Anti-Praeadamita* and *Bonum Nuncium Israelis,* proclaiming Israel's early redemption and the reconciliation of Jews and Christians at the impending arrival of the Messiah; Anders Pederson Kempe (1622-1689), Swedish translator and apostle of Felgenhauer; Oliger Paulli (1644-1714), pathological Christian chiliast, representative of "apocryphal philosemitism"; Moses Germanus (ca.1642-1701), originally Johann Peter Spaeth, a Catholic of Augsburg and convert to Judaism, exponent of biblical criticism, applied by him, however, to the New Testament only.

The second part is a study on "Rabbi" Johan Kemper of Uppsala, formerly Moses ben Aron, rabbinical student of Cracow, then follower of the Sabbataian movement, finally convert to Christianity, reader in rabbinics at the University of Uppsala, and translator of Matthew's *Evangelium* into Hebrew. His literary work, especially his commentary on Matthew, as well as the history and theology of Sabbatianism, are given particular attention.

In the second part the author adopts the same method that he applied to the personalities treated in the first part. A biographical sketch is followed by detailed information on the contents of their publications, and concludes with a historical evaluation of the various authors' ideologies against the contemporary religious and scholarly background. True, there are quite a number of debatable statements, e.g., "The Sabbataian movement was for Judaism of more trenchant and tragic consequences than, sixteen hundred years earlier, the separation of early Christianity from Judaism" (p. 96); the figure of 300,000 which he gives as the number of victims of the Chmielnicki pogroms of 1648; and other evaluations of Jewish history. There are, however, important supplements to the biographies of the personalities discussed and a wealth of bibliographical additions, mostly from Swedish

literature and libraries, among them some interesting discoveries and manuscript material. The same is true of parts three and four of the volume.

Part three, entitled, "Rabbinic Studies in Sweden 1676-1750," falls into five sections: I. Christian Hebraists in Sweden; II. Latin Translations of Rabbinic Works and Commentaries; III. Independent Publications [of Rabbinica in Sweden]; IV. Unpublished and Lost Works; V. References to Rabbinical Literature in Swedish Academic Dissertations. It is a matter of fact—strange as it may seem—that there is hardly another period in the history of Jewish literature that witnessed so intensive an interest in and extensive study of rabbinic writings as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In no other European country, neither earlier nor later, were as many Christian Hebraists at work as then. Except for a few preliminary studies for Sweden (cited on p. 134, n. 1) and the well-known researches of Bernhard Walde and Berthold Altaner for the medieval period (cf. also Jacob Meijer, "Hugo Grotius' Knowledge of Hebrew," *Historia Judaica,* XIV, 1952, 133-144) this interesting area of research entirely escaped the attention of scholars. All the more praiseworthy, then, is Schoeps's pioneer work for Sweden, which, next to Switzerland, can take a very honorable place in the history of Christian-Hebraic studies. The wealth of material presented in this part of the book is impressive, indeed, the fruits of studies extending over many years and numerous European libraries. As far as I can see, only one important and obviously rare work seems to have been overlooked by the author: *Collectio orationum funebrium in memoriam virorum eruditorum edita* (Leipzig, 1737; two vols., editor's name not given). It contains "*laudationes funebres*" exclusively of Swedish scholars, particularly of the University of Uppsala. There are found details to the biographies of Eric Benzelius, Michael Ennemannus, Olav Rudbeckius, including some references to their Judaistic studies. Specialists in the field and librarians, whose attention should be directed to Schoeps's book, may possibly find other lacunae, or offer their additions and corrections. There are some typographical errors; almost all the titles in the Czech language show spelling and other mistakes. But such minor *Schönheitsfehler* are unavoidable in a book like this. To append a desideratum of the reviewer in this connection: The reader would be grateful if, in a possibly revised new edition, the Swedish passages could be translated and the numerous supplements

and additions worked into their proper places in the pertinent text and notes.

Part four is of special interest for Jewish history. It is a compilation of excerpts from the diaries and letters of Swedish travelers, among them theologians and orientalists, in various European countries, where they visited Jewish communities, religious institutions, and scholars. These reports of personal impressions and experiences, in no case originally intended for publication or literary use, offer an attractive though merely a mosaic-like picture of European Jewish life and customs in the century preceding that of Jewish Emancipation, as seen through Swedish eyes. Moreover, in several cases, other information on Jewish life in these places and in the years in which the visits took place, are lacking. These reports are translated into German from the original Swedish. Dr. Carl Vilhelm Jacobowsky, Librarian at Skara, added a valuable bibliography of brief references to Jews and Judaism in foreign countries contained in Swedish travel diaries, letters, eulogies, etc., from 1640 to 1725, most of them in manuscript form in Swedish libraries.

The elaborate index of names will be very helpful for further research.

GUIDO KISCH
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Pascal, His Life and Works. By JEAN MESNARD. Preface by MONSIGNOR RONALD KNOX. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. xvi, 211 pp. $3.75.

If Pascal found man a paradox, it has often been the tendency of Pascal's biographers to conclude that he was, by his own definition, all too human. Looking at him from Voltaire's vantage point, it is easy to dismiss half of his life-work as an aberration, and to regret that one of the very greatest scientific minds of the seventeenth century was employed so much of the time in a fruitless attempt to resolve the senseless riddles proposed by that crypto-Manichaean, Augustine.

Jean Mesnard is greatly to be commended for having seen more deeply into Pascal and for having demonstrated beyond all possible question that ". . . there is a profound unity between Pascal's life and his work. . . . We cannot radically oppose the scientist to the man of

the world, or the scientist or the man of the world to the Christian; Pascal was always, in various fashions, a scientist, a man of the world, *and* a Christian. . . ." (p. 200).

There is not enough space at my disposal to call attention to the many lesser virtues of this book. Not the least of these is the ease with which the author guides us through the tangled confusion of contradictory documentary sources. His erudition leaves little to be desired, and he is sufficiently the master of it to be able to trace the thread through the labyrinth. Whenever his materials yield no certain conclusion, he is careful to say so; he then quite properly suggests reasonable hypotheses to fill the gap, and one rarely disagrees with his judgment as to which is the more likely to be true.

This is a book that could not have been written until fairly recently. For nearly twenty years the academic scholars have busied themselves with minutiae of texts, and have written mostly on the largely irrelevant problem of whether or not Pascal's ideas were "original." Meanwhile, the central question—that of the unity of Pascal's thought—has been pursued outside the universities by men of the caliber of Louis Lafuma and Jean Mesnard. The latter has profited much, as he acknowledges, from Lafuma's discoveries of crucial manuscripts and from his *Recherches pascaliennes* (Paris, 1949).

One might raise some doubts about the dictum expressed on page 188, to the effect that Pascal ". . . is in effect a precursor of contemporary existentialism." This is probably not true in any strict historical sense. Mesnard himself recognizes on the next page that "Pascal is . . . at the opposite pole to Kierkegaard in that he never gives the impression that man is necessarily crushed under the weight of his destiny, necessarily condemned to a perpetual painful anxiety. . . ." Nor should one omit to add Mesnard's very essential observation: "Pascal's existentialism . . . widely transcends the limits of modern existentialism, even if only through its concern for the universal."

Mesnard's book makes it abundantly clear that Pascal was at all times aware of the continuity between his religious and his scientific preoccupations. Just as he was a consistent experimentalist in physical science, so his religious apologetic was based on his certainty that God is accessible to us through facts alone and not primarily through reasoning. Experience and history reveal the duality of man's nature, and only Christianity can explain this fact.

This reviewer can only hope that Mesnard's book will find the large audience it deserves and that it will serve, as the author hopes, to identify the main problems connected with Pascal's life and work that still remain to be solved. But one must say that this book has advanced the study of these problems a long way.

RALPH H. BOWEN

Columbia University

God Hidden and Revealed. By JOHN DILLENBERGER. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1953. xxiv, 193 pp. $2.50.

A major theme in Luther's theology, though not often explored in contemporary writings, is that of the "hiddenness of God." God who has revealed himself is also mystery. He who has made himself known as God of grace likewise stands as the transcendent One who can never be fully grasped, ineffable power, terrifying majesty. The *deus revelatus* is also *deus absconditus.*

Professor Dillenberger, of Columbia University, has centered attention on that theme in this volume and performed the useful service of carrying it through a careful systematic-historical analysis. This he has done by means of an examination of the writings of major European theologians and Luther-interpreters since the middle of the nineteenth century, assessing both their interpretations of Luther on this matter and their own constructive uses of the theme in theological enterprise.

In the main, we find first that the historians of the Ritschlian school discovered little real value in the idea of the *deus absconditus,* though this was true among them in varying degrees, even as they had varying interpretations of what Luther meant when he used the term. Ritschl himself looked upon it as a vestige of scholasticism which left Luther with a God of arbitrariness and caprice, a hidden deity bound by no standard, alongside his knowable God revealed in terms of love. Thus, for him, the concept of hiddenness was simply to be rejected because of its intrusion of this irreconcilability into thinking on the divine nature. Of Ritschl's immediate followers, Friedrick Loofs and Adolf Harnack stand closest to him on this matter and repudiate the idea of the hidden God as a medieval remnant. Others, however, such as Karl

Holl and Ferdinand Kattenbusch, give the concept a somewhat more sympathetic treatment. Holl denies that it means arbitrariness and sees Luther using the term, instead, as referring to God's strange work of wrath which operates always, however, in the service of his proper work of love. For Kattenbusch the *deus absconditus* is also related to divine love, but in the sense that the mystery of its goodness is too great to be grasped and thus, in part, remains for man as the hiddenness of God. Yet even in these instances, says Professor Dillenberger, the concept is not developed in what should be its more crucial character, being simply a part of a basic sense of "at homeness" of men with God. And, indeed, in all instances of Ritschlian interpretation, because of the surrounding framework of Ritschlian thought, Luther is misunderstood.

From this point we are then led through major subsequent developments in the interpretation of this theme following the breakdown of the Ritschlian historical and theological points of view. Though again one confronts variety in thought, there is, all told, in Professor Dillenberger's judgment, a general deepening of the concept which now takes place, and likewise a more accurate appraisal of the meaning which it had in Luther's theology. Emanuel Hirsch relates the idea of God's hiddenness to his omnipotence defined in terms of *Allwirksamkeit,* showing the significance of that connection of ideas in Luther's own understanding. For Erich Seeberg the *deus absconditus* refers to the hiddenness of God within revelation itself, i.e., his disclosure of himself in antithesis, his revealing of himself in ways contrary to the expectations of the natural man. Paul Althaus and Werner Elert interpret Luther's thought by reference to the *theologia crucis* as its central factor. For Althaus especially, this means that God is hidden both behind his revelation and in his revelation. The revelation of the cross is the revelation of One who is hidden to natural sight and who continues to veil himself in the very act of revealing. This double aspect of hiddenness is likewise stressed in the analysis by Karl Heim when he speaks of the hiddenness of God apart from Christ and the hiddenness of God in Christ, though his main emphasis is actually upon the former and its relation to the doctrine of transcendence. Rudolf Otto investigates the *deus absconditus* in terms of nonrational factors and thus the "numinous consciousness" which Luther reflected in his references to the hidden God. He sees in Luther an unusual

combination of the nonrational and the rational, in which the hidden God of majesty takes on positive characterization, yet without losing his aura of terribleness and mystery. Finally, contemporary thought on these matters is investigated through a study of Emil Brunner and Karl Barth. In both these men Professor Dillenberger finds a renewed and more urgent insistence upon the correlation of hiddenness and revelation which, he feels, "carries a new sense for the integrity and vigor of the Christian message" (p. 101). Differences between the two are also noted carefully, however. For Brunner, hiddenness refers mainly to God apart from Christ and is dialectically related to the content of revelation. For Barth, the relationship is more organic, due to his vigorous emphasis upon revelation in Christ as the point of theological departure.

The volume then concludes with a chapter of systematic construction in which the author's point of view comes more particularly to the fore, where again the correlative relationship of hiddenness and revelation is strongly urged. God is known as hidden only when first known as revealed. And precisely where he is most revealed he is most hidden. And this means "that God is not different in essence than he manifests himself. But that manifestation itself is mystery as well as meaning, and comes out of a God who remains unfathomable, but of whom it may be affirmed that he is trustworthy on the basis of faith" (p. 171). The further implications of this correlation are likewise examined for related theological problems, with an especially thoughtful discussion of the relation of revelation and reason in which the role of reason in religious knowledge is not denied, but is interpreted in such a way as to give precedence to that divine disclosure without which God could not be known.

In a statement on the jacket, Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr has described this volume as a "brilliant analysis," and this reviewer is not disposed to disagree. It does seem to him that, in method, the lines of historical and systematic investigation do sometimes get a bit tangled. And likewise, in content, he finds himself wishing that neo-orthodoxy's emphasis upon the cross and resurrection as the center of revelation could be joined again more integrally to the life which was itself the channel of revelation and provided for them the basis of their meaning, with accompanying stress laid less upon the strangeness of the media and more upon their own inherent persuasiveness as the ground of

faith. But, withal, this is an important and splendid study which should be required reading for all students of nineteenth and twentieth century Christian thought.

JOHN VON ROHR

Pomona College

Philosophy and the Ideological Conflict. By CHARLES S. SEELY. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. 319 pp. $5.00.

The Soviet Impact on Society. By DAGOBERT D. RUNES. With a Foreword by HARRY ELMER BARNES. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. xiii, 202 pp. $3.75.

The Church under Communism. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. 79 pp. $2.75.

The casual reader of these three volumes would scarcely believe that they are treating of the same subject, the political and moral problem of the present day. This is not only because of their use of different facts, but because they present the same facts in such a different coloring.

The first of these works is typical of that school which is so engrossed in thought that it can ignore the present realities and sees the welfare of humanity, in which the author professes to believe, as something independent of the welfare of any individual. To him the present struggle is for the triumph of socialism, and this can only be achieved by the victory of Modern Materialism, the most adequate interpreters of which are Karl Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. He traces the conflict of idealism and materialism to ancient times, and while he admits that Jesus was a radical, he sees all of Christ's followers aligned with the dark forces of ignorance, coercion, and superstition. Today religion is the opium of the people. He admits that socialist dictatorship would not, perhaps, be necessary in advanced socialistic countries such as Great Britain, where the Labor Party is spreading ideas peaceably among an enlightened population, but he believes that the undeveloped parts of the world can only effectively progress under the domination of the Communist Party, and that violence results only from the attempts of the evil classes to maintain their power. To the author the statements of the Communist leaders are perfectly true, and he ignores all evidence that they are dominated by unworthy motives. In a sense

this was the position of too many intellectuals during the twenties and thirties.

The second volume, which was written before the Nazi-Soviet agreement of 1939, comes down to earth. It is a good, popular account of the career and ideas of Marx and his followers and emphasizes the latent anti-Semitism which marked the life of the founder of Communism. It is a moderate but damning indictment of the Soviet regime, and shows how the Soviet leaders from their coming to power have not only sought to tyrannize over their own people but to infiltrate America, with the object of overthrowing democracy and freedom in this country as everywhere else. The book is a good exposition and should be widely read, especially by the general reader.

The third volume is the second report of a Commission appointed by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland to consider the problem of Communism and its implications for Western religious thought. It opens with a brief survey of the Churches under Communism. On the whole, this is a brief but fair statement, especially in regard to the Protestants in the satellite states. But there are at least three important developments that are omitted. The first is the effort of the restored Patriarch of Moscow to use his position on behalf of the Soviet regime to dominate the Orthodox in the satellite states and weaken the influence of the Patriarch of Constantinople. The second is the suppression of the Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite in Western Ukraine and Romania, its forcible conversion to Orthodoxy, and the imprisonment or execution of the bishops of this Church. We may mention also the Roman Catholics of the Latin rite in Lithuania. The third is the fate of Protestantism in the countries now included in the Soviet Union. These are the Lutherans of Latvia and Estonia and the Baptists in Russia, who were at one time partially favored by the Soviet regime.

The most valuable part of this work is to be found in Part II, "Lessons to be Learned." This is a brief but serious summary of the problems offered by Communism and atheism throughout the world, the relation between church and state, and the methods that must be followed by the Christian Churches, if they would meet the challenge.

The three volumes then deal with three facets that we may term the esoteric, the real, and the religious. They emphasize in various ways the fact that we are facing both a struggle of ideas and a struggle of practi-

cal forces. It is too often said that ideas cannot be exterminated by force, and this argument is used by well-meaning people as an argument against an ideological war. Yet the proof that Communism does not hesitate to make use of war as a policy should make us cautious, while, at the same time, the free world must face the fact that neither arms nor ideas and programs of reform are sufficient by themselves. There must be a combination of the two elements to meet the threat of Communism on all of its levels. That will require far more serious efforts in both spheres than the world has yet made, but it can be done and must be done successfully, if the ideals of the Christian centuries are to find expression.

CLARENCE A. MANNING

Columbia University

Religious Faith, Language and Knowledge. By BEN F. KIMPEL. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. x, 162 pp.

Reading Professor Kimpel's vigorous criticism of Logical Positivist and kindred theories, one is reminded of Origen's exhortation, "Let everyone who cares for truth, care little about names and words. . . . Let him be more anxious about the fact signified." Professor Kimpel would not deny a due concern for names and words. What he challenges is a "widespread contemporary dogmatism" which, in its more extreme expressions, limits knowledge to a knowledge of language devices and the human attitudes thereby expressed, thus outlawing any possible knowledge of the transcendent reality affirmed in Christian theology.

Since "without theology there is no religious faith," the consequent engagement is a matter of more than academic interest. "Current empiricist theories of language" are largely responsible for "today's skepticism toward religious faith and religious institutions. . . . What is at stake is religious life itself." Hence there is urgent need for a new philosophical preface to theology, and Professor Kimpel essays to meet this need by a critical examination of modern theories of language and kindred epistemologies, and by indicating an alternative philosophy of language "compatible with the knowledge-claims of religious faith." As might be expected, he is more successful in his destructive forays than in his constructive alternative. His last chapter ends abruptly with a

criticism of a criticism of Kant, and it is not clear, at least to one reader, just what "criteria other than interpretations of faith" Professor Kimpel himself proposes (p. 135).

On the way to this twilight conclusion, however, he provides valuable ammunition for the theological apologist, and he might not unreasonably claim that his criticism of other positions sufficiently indicates his own position. In general, he charges the majority of our modern language analysts and epistemologists with living in too narrow a world. They are not sufficiently alive to the complexity of reality. They may be subtle, but they are also simple, content very often with an ability "to say more and more about less and less" (p. 9). What they say about language may be true as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. "Language is an instrument for expressing interpretations. Yet, interpretations in human life are not all confined to the way language terms are used" (p. 21). To deny this is "sheer dogmatism," and Professor Kimpel repeats the charge of dogmatism in chapter after chapter. It is, indeed, a great part of his case that the modern skeptic's position rests on presumptions and assumptions, unacknowledged or unrecognised. Kant, for example, is pilloried for his "sheer dogmatism" in maintaining that we know *nothing* of any realities existing apart from the forms of our statements, and for maintaining that the spatial pattern in which experiences are organized "is not at all a quality of things (pp. 31, 32). The Kantian position, once assumed, undermines any possible theological defence (p. 69).

"Theology is a metaphysic," and the archenemy of theology, in Professor Kimpel's view, is the rigorous Empiricism which affirms that man can know only his experiences. It is, he considers, this empiricist premise which makes most contemporary theories of language anti-theological. But the archenemy has been unwittingly welcomed in the camp of religion itself. Rudolf Otto's *The Idea of the Holy,* for example, has had a wide influence, but Otto, according to Professor Kimpel, is "incapable of analysing religious faith" because of his "very dogmatic dualism," which leads him to "repudiate any interpretation of a reality which is transcendent of experience" (p. 53). His "wholly other" merely designates experience. "What is holy and mysterious for a religious individual, according to Otto, is his own experience" and it is "unwarranted for Otto to say that wonder in religious life 'lies in the mysterious beatific experience of deity' " (pp. 49 f.).

As for Schleiermacher, pre-occupied with experience, the "so-called 'Father of Modern Protestant Theology,' " his ambiguity has had disastrous results, and "it may, therefore, be safe to say, if Schleiermacher's analysis of "religious faith had been subjected to a sound scrutiny many years ago, the Tradition of Protestant Theology in the western world might have been saved a detour into one of the most arid deserts in which one could lose his way" (p. 71).

Professor Kimpel has written a vigorous criticism. It may not convince his opponents, but perhaps he does not expect to do so. What he intends and what he achieves is a stimulating preface which may confirm the prospective theologian in the faith that his labor is not in vain. But he leaves us still wondering why the positions which he attacks attract students not less able and honest than himself. Granted that he has exposed confusion, ignorance, dogmatism, and "an almost pathological anxiety to save one's self from being accused of error in belief," the impression remains that a more penetrating sympathy might discover both more of truth and more of error in the challenging skepticism of our day. Professor Kimpel uses a rapier as well as a bludgeon, and his use of the bludgeon should not blind us to his more effective use of the rapier in this timely and valuable discussion of a difficult subject.

R. H. L. Slater

McGill University

What Is Religion? By Alban G. Widgery. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953. xi, 330 pp. $5.00.

When F. R. Tennant published his lectures on "The Philosophy of Religion," he called his treatise *Philosophical Theology*. Admiring such precision of terminology, Alban G. Widgery has dedicated his *What is Religion?* to Tennant. According to Professor Widgery, there has been a considerable confusion of terminology which he seeks to clear up in an Appendix entitled, "Religious Philosophy, Rational Theology, Natural Theology, Philosophical Theology, and Philosophy of Religion." Religious Philosophy is the treatment of the whole field of experience from a religious orientation. Rational Theology, Natural Theology, and Philosophical Theology, treat religious *ideas,* with increasing empiricism in the order named, and are frequently misnamed Philosophy

of Religion—misnamed because of their abstraction from living religious experience.

According to Professor Widgery, a true Philosophy of Religion, such as he has attempted to write, must be concerned not only with the ideas of intellectuals, and certainly not solely with the concepts of a particular religion, but must take for its field of investigation what religion has meant to all men of all cultures. He defines Philosophy of Religion as "a critical and constructive departmental philosophy having as fundamental data the facts of religion as experienced in the individual consciousness and embodied socially in the historical religions" (p. 58). The author's competence is attested to by Professor Charles S. Braden, who says, "I have nowhere read a book on the philosophy of religion which was based so completely on the data furnished by the psychology of Religion, and the history of religion as this one . . . his knowledge of the history of religion is encyclopedic." The critical reader may be annoyed by the absence of footnotes or bibliography, but Professor Widgery candidly admits that, while "the amount of literature I have studied relevant to religion has been immense, . . . in the present work I have avoided any parade of erudition, any resting on the authority of others, any criticism of views of specifically identified thinkers. . . . I present my own conclusions in the simplest and most direct manner" (p. x). Some of these conclusions are as follows.

Philosophy of Religion may not depend upon the Philosophy of Nature or upon Moral Philosophy because, as Otto says, religion is sui generis. Most religious assertions may be neither proved nor disproved naturalistically or rationalistically. Naturalism is to be rejected because it fails to take religious experience sufficiently into account. At the same time, Absolute Idealism is also to be rejected, as religious experience is dualistic, referring to both physical and mental or spiritual existence. A monism, whether materialistic or idealistic, is a product of rationalistic reflection, not religion. Thus the Advaitist (non-dualism) philosophy of India does not represent the religion of the Indian people, but is a product of the reflections of a few philosophers.

The Philosophy of Religion of most of the major faiths is that of personal theism. A religion which does not take this position is inadequate for the achievement of the highest spiritual life. Religions which, like Buddhism and Jainism, reject a personal God in their creeds, often imply one in the religious experiences of their adherents.

No religion is to be preferred above another, but some are superior to others in certain areas. Thus Islam shows the fullest development of prayer, but is deficient in social worship. Roman Catholicism has the most highly developed worship, but includes many magical elements. Buddhism excels in the virtues of contemplation and inner peace, but its concept of nirvana is inadequate as a religious hope. Christianity emphasizes the highest ideal, that of love of God and man, but is vitiated by too much dependence upon its creeds.

Religion is primarily concerned with the positive values of communion with God, and while salvation from suffering and sin is important in all religions, it is, nevertheless, a secondary interest.

Professor Widgery deals systematically with practically all of the problems of the Philosophy of Religion, but his book suffers from the defect of its virtues, and the treatment is often so brief that *What is Religion?* is more of a prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion than a full-fledged treatise. But this is, no doubt, unavoidable in a work of this size, and Professor Widgery has opened up a line of investigation that reflects a current interest in a broader, less provincial base for religious studies.

Roland Stahl

University of Connecticut

The Sign of Jonas. By Thomas Merton. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., Inc., 1953. 362 pp. $3.50.

The inequality which is the rule of most diaries and commonplace books, whether by writers religious or non-religious, holds conspicuously true for Thomas Merton's journal of six years as a brother in the Cistercian Order at the Abbey of Gethsemani. From his first publications as a surrealist or expressionist poet to his most recent books on religious subjects, he has at all times been a writer of striking intuitions and surprising delinquencies, in part a poet, in part a barbarian, at times precious and at times vulgar, now in the literary *avant-garde,* now in the ranks of unabashed propagandists. His qualities as a writer are much the same, whether the cause for which he writes be himself or his sacred calling. From many points of view his latest book merits attention as stimulating and suggestive, although even within

its own terms it reveals these pronounced discrepancies. This is owing in part to the author's unrestrained aspirations, which leave him uncomfortably wavering between the sublime and the bathetic. Although his soul may well be saved with Jonah, in art and apologetics he more nearly resembles the inflammable Icarus.

The present diary is offered as record of his life and thoughts following the acceptance by his publishers of his sensational success, *The Seven Story Mountain*. The journal is, of course, in no sense a complete record. It would seem that only entries of special interest and appropriate subject-matter are chosen. Especially the psychologist will feel that much is lacking. Yet its pages present an almost alarming medley of material, recording the thoughts of a man whose mind is itself, to use the language of one of our older poets, "a dreadful miscellany." One encounters bad writing, smart slang, abundant commonplace. But there is also a peculiar fascination in this frank hodgepodge of materials, with their violent lack of transition. On its surface the book resembles a quarry with many shining crystals and fragments of color and beauty. The reader is invited, if he cares, to put the pieces together so that the character of the man or some scheme of ideas emerges from the most palpable confusion. And the confusion, with certain slight allowances for attitudinizing, is distinctly lifelike. There can be no doubt that the book is alive.

Insofar as it tells a story, this is, first of all, the record of a sorely disturbed mind at length more or less composed under the enforced order of a monastery. God's hospital has effected a cure presumably beyond the range of orthodox psychiatry. All his typically modern dislocations to the contrary, Merton is unquestionably a poet, now, as he was a dozen years ago. His journal contains one lyric in baroque verse but many more lyrics in prose. As the author himself observes, it relates the painful efforts of the romantic artist to adjust himself to the life of a religious order, whose assistance he nevertheless required. His last book of prose may not be as perceptive art as his first book of verse, but it, too, rises in certain passages to the status of art. It reveals the struggle of a particularly distressed and, it must be admitted, vain personality with the problem of inner well-being. The story is, on the whole, happy. The disciplines of the physical and sacramental life lessened the strain of a mind torn between the demands of the artist and

the mystic. Merton records not only his more personal struggles but his discomfort in finding taste within the monastery so often, in his eyes, bad. It appears that this religious haven was no paradise for the aesthete.

Such a journal consists of nothing except details, but the details are at times not without their fascination. There is a wry pathos in the account of his mad driving of a jeep through the monastic woods—the romantic poet on the loose with nature. He is both revealing and wholly sincere when admitting that, in mystical writing, Rilke surpasses him in style and Emily Dickinson in content. A fine description of a hawk is worthy of Gerard Manley Hopkins. Merton's hymn to Saint Agnes reminds us that, as a poet, he is at his best comparable to Edith Sitwell. His appreciation of the violence as well as the serenity of nature proves not unnoteworthy. The sketch of a junk wagon driven by an old negro, an image in one of Merton's recurrent dreams, has great vividness. Near the end of his book an imaginative essay on three levels of experience, in action, dream, and contemplation, leads to the patristic symbol of Jonas and the whale. Merton conceives of himself as the prophet and the whale as his monastery, carrying him, by way of "paradox," to his salvation. There is some unconscious irony as he describes the transition from language to silence, from the clatter of literary and scholarly debate in New York to the mute walls of a Trappist monastery in the woodlands of Kentucky, where paratroopers fallen from a noisy sky are probationers for their re-ascent into a quieter heaven. Merely as an impersonal record of life in the cloister the pages have considerable worth. But the dubious humor in an ascetic life divorced alike from body and mind, from bawdry or wit, and the petulance of Grub Street, new style, seriously detracts from the book's dignity. Its values are threefold, aesthetic, psychological and religious, and it is in this descending order of importance that the values will be found. There is plenty of good ore to be got out of this quarry, if the reader has the necessary patience and is not over-troubled by the stagnant waters at its bottom.

HENRY W. WELLS

Columbia University

The Eternal Drama: By Richard Rosenheim. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. 303 pp. $6.00

Richard Rosenheim, for three decades one of the most progressive theatre managers and directors in the Central European countries and author of a *History of the German Theatres in Prague,* has published, after ten years of research, a book which, to him and, as he hopes, also to his readers, means more than a book only about the theatre. However, it seems, the book would mean more, if it were more a book only about the theatre.

The title "The Eternal Drama" refers to the eternal existence of drama as an expression of the human creative spirit, but mainly to "The Eternal Drama of Cosmos, God and Man," through which mankind is guided by initiated ones to a higher spirituality. Mr. Rosenheim rightly believes "the miracle of stage is accomplished" when man "is transmuted by beholding transmutation." But "our time has preserved only a pale recollection of the true mission of drama" by whose "magic spell mystical death is changed into resurrection and ascension." The author has gathered an enormous material from 5000 years of drama, and it is the special merit of the book that he presents many facts either unknown to or wilfully neglected by theatre historians. The history of the theatre before the classical Greek drama has not yet been written, and reading the chapters on the mystery plays of ancient Egypt, of the Mayas and Aztecs, of the Tibetans and the early Greeks makes you think that Mr. Rosenheim is attempting to write it.

But soon one notices that, despite his vast dramatic knowledge, he has not consulted important reliable books of the last two decades and that he likes to use doubtful sources (such as Le Plongeon or Schuré). Furthermore, it becomes more and more obvious that, as a passionate follower of Steiner's anthroposophy, he judges the entire history of the mystery play, and of the drama and theatre in general, as well as the history of mankind and all religion, exclusively in the light of anthroposophical teachings and values. This one-sided method appears the more harmful the further he develops the line from the "victory of dogma over gnosticism" (Peter against Plato and Paul), "the ways of

medieval drama and theatre," and the *Divine Comedy* to Shakespeare, Goethe's *Faust,* Byron, Wagner, Nietzsche, and the drama of the present.

In order not to be disappointed, one should read the book beginning with the last, the ninth part, in which Rudolf Steiner is designated "as the appointed messenger of Christ in our times," who "went with Goethe beyond Goethe, and, at the crossroad of natural and spiritual science, was permitted to discover the law of individual reincarnation and karma as the fundamental biogenetic law of higher worlds, wherein eternal beings sustain eternal life in eternal metamorphosis." After such words, it is not astonishing that Rudolf Steiner and Albert Steffen are represented as the fulfillment of the mystery drama, *The Tempest* as Shakespeare's and *Faust* as Goethe's Christian testament to posterity, and Richard Wagner as "the greatest dramatist of the nineteenth century," whose musical works are "the twelve Calvary stations of a great initiate of art," and whose *Die Meistersinger* "represents not only the most profound but also the only genuine mystery drama conceived by the master of Bayreuth," although, as the author admits, this is the only one of his operas which Wagner himself does not consider as a mystery.

This is said, not as a polemic against Anthroposophy or the admirable theatrical performances in the Goetheanum at Dornach, but to state that it is impossible to evaluate the multiform history of drama and the theatre, or even of high tragedy and mystery merely by Steiner's teachings. Mr. Rosenheim emphasizes in his preface that his book "might be taken as a treatise, a confession and a challenge." In my opinion, the confession and challenge diminishes the value of the treatise and of the attempt at "rendering a truly comprehensive picture of the wondrous ways of drama and theatre throughout five thousand years." There are not many people today who know so much about the theatre as Mr. Rosenheim, and there are very many pages in his work which prove that he would be able to write the still missing "truly comprehensive" history of the drama.

KURT PINTHUS

Columbia University

BOOK NOTES

Djanggawul: An Aboriginal Religious Cult of North-Eastern Arnhem Land. By Ronald M. Berndt. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. xxiii, 320 pp., 29 ill., $7.50.

Here, at long last, is an authoritative account of the religion of a native Australian people which is, at the same time, rich in detail and uncolored by theoretical preconceptions. The author and his wife spent thirteen months for the University of Sydney among the aborigines of Arnhem Land, who are widely known from W. L. Warner's *A Black Civilization* (1937) as the "Murngin" nation. Learning the language and participating intimately in the life and activities of this still largely unacculturated people, they acquired a measure of understanding and insight which have rarely been equaled in anthropological work. No serious student of mankind's religious experience can afford to overlook this book.

Among the several cycles of myth and ritual prevailing concurrently in this society, some concerned with age-graded initiation ceremonies and others of a revelatory but non-initiatory character, the author has chosen for detailed consideration one of the latter, which, though primarily associated with the Dua moiety, is probably the most fundamental of all. It concerns the Djanggawul, an ancestral brother and his two sisters, who came to northern Australia by canoe from the mythical land of Bralgu, wandered over the country, peopled it, and left the sacred emblems around which the ceremonial life has since revolved.

Except for sections of comment and analysis, the content falls into two main divisions: (1) the complete myth of the Djanggawul, pieced together from innumerable segments related in connection with specific geographical or cultural phenomena, and (2) a parallel epic song cycle of extraordinary poetic quality, which is commonly recited as a unit. Despite minor inconsistencies, inevitable in completely oral tradition, the two portions support one another and together yield an incomparable picture of the mode of thought and feeling and of the basic system of values of a simple people.

Human reproductive processes and fertility occupy a position of central importance, for upon them are believed to depend not only the welfare and survival of mankind but the growth of plants and animals, the appearance and flow of water, and, indeed, all the meteorological processes of nature. Sexual subjects are treated throughout with great interest and complete frankness but without erotic elaboration.

Several widespread assumptions about the Australian aborigines are shattered. The male role in procreation, instead of being ignored, is explicitly stressed in the myth. Women, instead of being conceived of as profane in contrast to the sacredness of the male sex, are actually invested with a special aura of sanctity because of the importance of their reproductive functions. Far from being ignorant of the myths, rituals, and sacred objects from which they are ceremonially excluded, the women revealed to the author's wife a surprisingly

comprehensive knowledge of esoteric matters.

In summary, this book can be confidently recommended on two counts—as an unsurpassed document on primitive religion, and as a record of native poetry which is probably unparalleled.

GEORGE PETER MURDOCK

Race-Relations in Ancient Egypt: Greek, Egyptian, Hebrew, Roman. By S. DAVIS. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. xiii, 176 pp. $4.50.

Dr. Davis, a classical scholar, presents in a lucid style the racial, religious, political, and economic relations among the Greeks, Egyptians, Jews, and Romans in ancient Alexandria. The choice of locale for an investigation of inter-racial relationship was felicitous, since Alexandria was a new city and its inhabitants constituted a medley of races and nationalities. The essay is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the Greek idea of racial superiority and Alexander's ideal of a super-state based on a common culture rather than on race. The second part deals with the problem of the relations among the Greeks, Egyptians, Jews, and Romans in Alexandria. The third part discusses the Roman attitude on race.

By far the most original and rewarding section of the book is the second part, in which the author deals with the problems of Jewish citizenship in Alexandria and the origins of anti-Semitism. Here his conclusions are based on original source material, and they represent a welcome contribution to much debated subjects. The same cannot be said, unfortunately, for the chapters treating the histories of Egypt and Mesopotamia. Here, the author reached his conclusions on the basis of secondary and unreliable sources. Dr. Davis tells us that "The Semitic nations possessed a rich mythology and an Epic, namely the Nimrod Epic" (p. xiii). This is, of course, the famous Epic of Gilgamesh, translated many times into several European languages. On page 44 he makes the flat statement that "divine kingship was normal in the ancient Orient," which it was not, with the exception of Egypt. And on page 74, he refers to the Canaanites and the Amorites as "a tribe called Canaanites . . . a powerful tribe known as Amorites."

I. M.

The Hall of Light, a Study in Early Chinese Kingship. By WILLIAM EDWARD SOOTHILL. Ed. by LADY HOSIE and G. F. HUDSON. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952, xxii, 289 pp. $7.50.

The volume under review is a striking example of the double-edgedness of posthumous publications. Professor Soothill held the chair of Chinese Language and Literature at the University of Oxford until his death in 1935, and was generally considered the Nestor of British sinology. He has always been known for his genuine and profound interest in Chinese religion, and the pres-

ent volume again testifies to his grasp of fundamental religious problems. The Ming-t'ang or "Hall of Light" is definitely one of the most important religious institutions of China's pre-imperial past, if not the most important. Traditions connected with this institution have lingered on through many of the imperial Chinese dynasties. As no comprehensive monograph on this topic exists, the publication of this volume would seem warranted. Furthermore, the general approach of Professor Soothill deserves careful consideration. From the outset, the author was aware of the close interconnection—as expressed in the subtitle—between the site of, and the rituals performed at, the Hall of Light and the political structure of the ancient Chinese state, especially the position and functions of the king. In addition, Professor Soothill was struck by the eminently astronomical character of this politico-religious institution, an insight that is probably the most important contribution of his studies. Finally, Professor Soothill is to be credited with certain research techniques that, at the time of his writing, were far from generally accepted. His study is comparative inasmuch as he adduced as parallels non-Chinese, especially Near-Eastern and Roman, institutions of a similar character; and it is interdisciplinary inasmuch as he included opinion and advice of his Oxonian colleagues, especially in the field of astronomy.

This much said, it is the sad task of the reviewer to add that the editors found Professor Soothill's manuscript in a stage that made it not really publishable. Apparently, what Professor Soothill had left was not much more than a very first survey of the problems involved: some of the original texts; some opinions of authorities, both ancient and recent; some preliminary, and at times rather intuitive, results of his exploratory ramblings; most of it still rather unorganized and not yet critically digested. Also, statements are included in these notes which were current in Professor Soothill's time, but strike us as rather naïve today. The task before the editors, once filial piety and a disciple's devotion had induced their resolve to have these notes published, was thus formible. They chose to leave the manuscript basically unchanged with only a few additional notes, not always wisely selected. (They disregard entirely specific contributions to the topic published since Professor Soothill's death, and include, instead, a letter by Chiang Kai-shek which has nothing whatsoever to do with the problems of this study.) The result is not satisfactory. It might be seriously questioned whether the publication in this form enhances scholarship, or, for that matter, the reputation of the deceased author.

HELLMUT WILHELM

Religion and Society among the Coorgs of South India. By M. N. SRINIVAS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1952. xii, 267 pp. $6.00.

The inter-relations of religion and society is the subject of this study of the Coorgs, a handsome, well-to-do and powerful people with a martial tradition

behind them. They claim to be *kshatriyas* and furnished 1,300 enlisted men in the last war. The first Commander-in-Chief of the Indian army, General K. M. Cariappa, is a Coorg. Their country, an area of 1,593 square miles, lies in the Western Ghats, in the far southwest of the Indian Peninsula. Their sacred river is the Kāvēri. Of their number, 163,327, according to the census of 1931, 146,007 are Hindus. They are a mixed people having close affinities with their neighbors. Rice has been their chief agricultural product, but it now shares importance with coffee, sandalwood, and cardamom.

Pollution, "a fundamental quality of the caste system," governs all relationships, from the individual, through the family, the village, and the larger social units, and ritual serves in every detail of personal and corporate life. The *okka* is the joint patriarchal family, with an ancestral house and estate. But members of the family are scattered all over Coorg, and often all over India. Their meetings as a whole are limited to occasions like marriage and death. The village is made up of a number of *okkas* somewhat scattered; and several of these constitute a *nād*. Several of these combine to make a *kombu*, twelve of which formed the kingdom of Coorg. Not the least interesting of their customs is the way in which male members are raised up for a family which has come to the place where no head survives.

One aspect of changing customs and rituals is the process of "Sanskritization," the details of shifts from an older to a Hinduised community. A single illustration involves the Kāvēri River, now considered as a manifestation of Pārvatī, consort of Shiva. She is now Mother Kāvēri. The unifying and preservative functions of religion in society are plain in this most minutely analyzed study of the Coorgs.

GEORGE W. BRIGGS

The Scriptures of Mankind, "An Introduction." By CHARLES S. BRADEN. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952. xiii, 496 pp. $6.50.

This book by the Professor of History and Literature of Religions at Northwestern University, outgrowth of a long career of teaching, is intended primarily for students, but there is little doubt that it will prove equally useful to teachers. In his Preface, Professor Braden tells us that he wrote it because he himself has "felt the need for just such a book" for his classes, which seems to this reviewer the best of all possible reasons for writing a book! Undergraduate courses in the world's religions are so recent a development that there is still a great need for books of this sort. A good many anthologies have been published in recent years, but, as Professor Braden says, "most of them present only the text with almost nothing by way of explanation of its origin or meaning." It is this lack which he here undertakes to supply.

The scope of the work is extensive, to say the least, including chapters on "pre-literate sacred scriptures" (according to dictionary meanings, a contradiction in terms!), the sacred literature of the Egyptians, Babylonians, Hindus,

Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs, Chinese, Japanese, Zoroastrians, Jews, Christians, and Muslims. There is a final chapter on modern sacred books which includes the Tenrikyo and Konkyo sects of Shinto, the Bahais, Christian Scientists, Mormons, and a sprinkling of minor American sects belonging rather to the "lunatic fringe." The text is enriched by a great number of quotations from the various scriptures, by so many, in fact, that it becomes almost an anthology itself. Whether, from the teacher's point of view, this is an advantage or not, seems somewhat problematical, since it adds to the size and cost of the book, and since most teachers prefer to make their own selections. If Professor Braden would now condense his valuable commentary into an inexpensive student's handbook, he would put us even more deeply in his debt.

M. B.

Christian Inscriptions. By H. P. V. Nunn. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. 72 pp. $2.50.

A convenient edition of a very brief selection of early Christian inscriptions, with an interesting introduction. The familiar ones are there—the epitaph of Abercius and the inscription of Pectorius—and a rather fuller collection of inscriptions of Pope Damasus. The chief advantage of this edition is the English translation that accompanies the inscriptions.

Frederick C. Grant

Clerii Comitalis Circulär 1723-1772 (Circulars of the Clerical Estates 1723-1772). By Carl-E. Normann. Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses Bokförlag, 1952. 446 pp. Kr. 27.

This work constitutes Volume 29 in "Collections and Studies in Swedish Church History." As the title indicates, Swedish Lutheran clergy still slipped into Latin on slight provocation two centuries or more after the Reformation. Until parliamentary reform, in 1866, put an end to the old diet of four estates, the Circulars continued to be sent to the consistory courts of the dioceses. As the earlier circulars were not readily accessible in print, some not having been printed at all, it was decided to publish the earlier ones, those belonging to the "Age of Liberty," but not until they could be accompanied by a commentary giving their historical setting and explaining their significance. This Professor Normann does in an exposition covering two thirds of the volume, the Circulars themselves making up the remaining third. There is also a brief summary in English and a bibliography. The author knows his period and his subject, and has done his work well. He is writing, of course, for educated Swedish readers familiar with the particular situation of the Swedish state church and its history. Other readers would require considerable additional information not supplied by this text.

Real power resided, under a nominal king, in a Riksdag of four equal

estates, representing the clergy, nobility, burghers, and peasants. The clerical estate was the smallest, with fifty or fewer members. A concurrence of any three estates could decide almost all questions. The other estates debated and voted on ecclesiastical matters and could overrule the clergy, who, similarly, debated and voted on secular affairs. The clergy maintained that, in regard to religion, they should be recognized as leaders, with special interest and insight, but this claim was sometimes disputed by the other estates. While favoring improvements in religious education, etc., the clergy generally fought, in most cases successfully, for the maintenance of the status quo in religion. They maintained the earlier conception of a state church against the modern one which began to emerge and finally prevailed. According to the old conception, state and church were one society; Sweden was a modern Israel, resting on God and His Word as interpreted in the unaltered Augsburg Confession. This conception was recognized in the Swedish constitution. The Church was the organ of this society for the religious life; the government, for the political life.

The clergy were specially zealous for the preservation of orthodoxy. During the earlier part of the period they resisted the pietistic movement, suspicious of its doctrinal aberrations; later, they resisted the rationalism of the Enlightenment, with its pressure for religious toleration. These movements found more support in the other estates, where protests were heard against the worldliness and moral laxity and lack of true spirituality among the clergy. The other estates were also disposed to champion the cause of the curates and lower clergy against the high ecclesiastics who controlled the clerical estate.

The dioceses were controlled by bishops and consistories, and the clerical estate attempted to set itself up as a Consistorium Regni, but soon was forced to drop this claim. The Circulars were not law; they simply contained admonitions and statements of policy for the clergy to follow. They did not deny that there were many self-seeking, indifferent, and unworthy men of the cloth, and pleaded for more care in ordaining men into the ministry and better supervision of them afterwards. They appealed to the whole clerical profession to set a good Christian example, in order not to give the enemies of the Church occasions for attack.

CONRAD PETERSON

A History of Christianity. By KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953. xxvii, 1523 pages. $9.50.

At the hour of his retirement, Professor Latourette has presented to church history students the most comprehensive of the one volume histories of Christianity. The distinguished author has always in his historical work shown an unusually keen consciousness of the geographical factor. The evidence of this valuable quality is abundant in all parts of this volume, and the reader will be especially grateful for the twenty excellent maps that are included. The book

is comprehensive, too, in the sense that it represents a carefully proportioned selection of data from all areas of the vast field that it undertakes to treat.

In an ample preface, Latourette states the basis of his interpretation of the Christian movement. Having referred briefly to a number of "philosophies" of history, he observes:

> At the outset, however, we must say as clearly as we know how that underlying the pages which follow there is a profound conviction that the Christian Gospel is God's supreme act on man's behalf and that the history of Christianity is the history of what God has done for man through Christ and of man's response.

This faith is not tediously preached in the work, but it is not forgotten. The possibility of complete objectivity is realistically denied, but the various branches of the Christian Church are treated with charity and understanding.

The chronological divisions familiar to readers of the author's *Expansion of Christianity* are utilized here, and the theme of expansion and recession receives more emphasis than appears in most histories. The text is broken into eleven unnumbered sections. These differ in length from one to fourteen chapters, and there are sixty-one chapters in all. No less than sixteen of these deal with the period since 1815. Latourette brings to the later period, where most of our historians have grown weary or perplexed and cut the story short, all the energy of his research and the interest of a hopeful cause. Facing the anti-Christian elements of which we are all conscious in modern life, he maintains a cautiously optimistic outlook upon the Christian forces as he leads us through their struggles in the recent past. He likes to speak of "the pulsation of advance, retreat and advance" as marking the story of Christianity; and the whole tendency of his thought is toward the recognition of "advance" as the dominant theme. Some may complain that this conception is developed too much in terms of human geography and with too little attention to the nature and variety of religious experience and expression. Yet a single volume, even a large one, could hardly afford space for any extended analysis of the works of great Christian thinkers. As it is, references to notable writers and trends of thought, and characterizations of significant leaders and movements, are systematically provided, and these are in general admirably just and clear. A few personages of measurable eminence are omitted from mention, but the book is of such firm texture that we may attribute these omissions not to negligence but to the author's thoughtful choice and sense of proportion.

The proof-reading has been well done, but one finds "Tanchelin" for "Tanchelm" (p. 459), *Anfectungen* for *"Anfechtungen"* (p. 741); and the Swedish churchman Laurentius Andreae is repeatedly called "Andreas" (pp. 737 ff.).

The history of Christianity is seen here as a structure of magnificent dimensions, and the work is marked by clarity, penetration, sound judgment, and mature scholarship.

J. T. M.

The Christian Society. By STEPHEN NEILL. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953. xiv, 334 pages. $3.50.

This book has been prepared as a unit in the series, "A Library of Constructive Theology" of which the general editor is W. R. Matthews. In his preface Bishop Neill indicates that his interpretation of the title assigned to him, "the Christian Society," was such as to exclude the treatment of dogma and theology, and incidentally intimates that he is at work on another book in which he will treat the history of doctrine. He writes, of course, as a member of the "society" that forms his subject, but pretty successfully aims to avoid asserting the special viewpoints of his own communion. Within the limited space occupied, a more satisfactory presentation of Christianity in history could hardly have been produced. Fact and interpretation are throughout charmingly co-ordinated. The style is sprightly, and even the footnotes are readable.

Bishop Neill cultivates no illusions about the qualities exhibited by Christians in times past. "In point of fact," he remarks, "from the beginning the Christian fellowship has been a strange amalgam of good and evil." Yet he shows a peculiar respect for the early generations, and finds in them a certain vividness of Christian experience that was not later maintained. He is appreciative of some of the important developments of the Middle Ages, but in view of "the spectacle of the head of the Christian society in the West deliberately giving up whole provinces to fire and slaughter," he asks "whether that Christian society . . . had not . . . strayed at the central point from the allegiance of Christ."

Modern missions and ecumenical effort are treated with fresh interest. Of the other major movements affecting modern Christianity, only Pietism (in which Methodism is included) receives an extended notice, and no adequate explanation of its origins is given. It is here stated that "the idea of conversion as an experience to be undergone by the baptized Christian . . . first comes into prominence in connection with Pietism and the movements derived from it." Surely the learned author is aware that conversion of the baptized Christian was a familiar concept in medieval monastic piety, and that in a sense extremely close to that in which it was employed by the Pietists, some decades before the work of their founder, Spener, Puritans like Richard Baxter laid great emphasis upon this idea. But there are few such inadvertences as this in the book, which is marked on the whole by sharp accuracy as well as by insight and wisdom.

J. T. M.

Socialdemokraten och kyrkan 1881-1890. By BERNDT GUSTAFSSON. Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses Bokförlag, 1953. xvii, 420 pp. Kr. 27.

Berndt Gustafsson's *Socialdemokraten och kyrkan* is the thirtieth volume of the series Samlingar och Studier till Svenska Kyrkans Historia, edited by Hilding Pleijel of Lund University. It has been my privilege to review a

few of the earlier volumes of this series for *The Review of Religion,* and among these was Gustafsson's *Kyrkoliv och samhällsklass i sverige omkr. 1880.* The two volumes have much in common and represent a serious effort to explain the attitude of labor toward the Church. The period covered in Swedish history is the one which saw the birth of the Social Democratic Labor Party. *Socialdemokraten och kyrkan* is an excellent study of a subject of the greatest importance. We might well regret the role of the Church in the nineteenth century as an agency for the status quo in society, in the light of which the hostile attitude of organized labor toward the Church is very understandable. If the Socialists had not been unfriendly to the Church, we would have had reason to wonder why.

Berndt Gustafsson's approach to the problem involved in his study is not one which most secular historians would use. He defines most carefully his objectives and becomes rather pedantic or stilted in carrying them out. Other critics might well praise the author for his painstaking efforts to define the problem which he faced and congratulate him on his organization. In ten chapters Gustafsson discusses the attitude of the Social Democrats toward the Church, which, of course, is here the Established Church of Sweden; the growth of the Social Democratic movement; the urban laborer's attitude toward the Church; rural labor's attitude toward the Church; the views found within the Church with special reference to class distinction and the existence of a general negative attitude toward the Church; the social background in its relationship to these attitudes; and the Church in an age of social consciousness. These titles are not the exact translations of the chapter headings, but they intend to reveal the content of the book under review as correctly as possible.

It is needless to point out the relationship of Gustafsson's earlier volume on *Kyrkoliv och samhällsklass* to several of the above chapters. The first three chapters devote considerable space to a discussion of the sources used and how these might be evaluated, and these impress the reviewer as especially pedantic, since the problem involved is not peculiar to this study. The person who has done considerable study on nineteenth century Sweden will find little new in the work. The author maintains a scholarly and an objective point of view, which the average reader might well wish that he could have discarded. A work like *Socialdemokraten och kyrkan* should be written with feeling as the Church is castigated. This the author does not do. The Church still needs to wear sackcloth and ashes for its failure to be the herald of a happier age resting on social justice.

O. Fritiof Ander

The American Church of the Protestant Heritage. Edited by Vergilius Ferm. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. 481 pp. $6.00.

Dr. Ferm has edited a most useful collection of essays, each devoted to the compact treatment of an American Protestant denominational tradition by

one of its own leaders. All of the larger denominational families of over a million members are presented: Lutheran, Presbyterian, Episcopal, Congregational Christian, Baptist, Methodist and Disciples. A number of the smaller bodies are also discussed: Moravian, Mennonite, Reformed, Unitarian, United Presbyterian, Quaker, Mission Covenant, Brethren, Evangelical and Reformed, Universalist, Evangelical United Brethren, Seventh-Day Adventist, Churches of Christ and the Church of God (Anderson, Indiana). The twenty-one accounts thus deal with all of the larger, and a representative group of the smaller, Protestant bodies; together they form a valuable reference book for those who are interested in American religious life in particular and in American history and culture in general.

The separate chapters are necessarily brief, but in each an attempt has been made to combine consideration of the European background and American history of each tradition with a description of its present distinctive features: theological emphases, type of polity, leading institutions, important leaders, main publications. Especially valuable is the coherent way in which the complex organizational patterns of certain denominational families are explained; in particular, the chapters on the Lutherans, the Presbyterians, the Mennonites, the Quakers and the Baptists make clear the complex historical developments and resulting contemporary divisions within those traditions. Conversely, such chapters as those on the Evangelical and Reformed Church and the Evangelical United Brethren Church are most helpful in tracing the various streams that have flowed together in recent years to form these sizeable bodies. Indeed, the book as a whole provides much evidence that the fissiparous trends of nineteenth-century Protestantism have been slowed and in many significant ways reversed.

On the whole, the accounts are straightforward and fair—fortunately only rarely have the authors yielded to the temptation of making claims that leave false or erroneous impressions. For example, the statement that the Universalists were the first body of religionists to go on record as opposing human slavery in any form, in 1790, should be qualified to take account of vigorous Quaker activity in this field long before 1790. The indirect claim that the first Sabbath School in the United States can be traced to a certain member of a certain church in New York cannot be sustained. The treatment of the Presbyterian Adopting Act of 1729 is somewhat one-sided; the author has claimed too much when he finds in it ". . . the first official declaration by any organized church in the colonies of the principle of the separation of Church and State" (p. 75). But such slips are few in this lucid compendium of information about the American Church of the Protestant heritage.

ROBERT T. HANDY

Henry Drummond: an Anthology. Edited by JAMES W. KENNEDY. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953. 253 pp. $3.00.

The name Henry Drummond means little to the present generation, although most large public libraries contain a fairly complete collection of his writings. This ignorance is our loss, for he is an important figure in the cultural history of the late nineteenth century, a theological graduate also well trained in the natural sciences, who worked with both the evangelist Moody and the geologist Geikie in an age when churchmen and scientists customarily mistrusted each other. And in his short career he contributed notably to three areas of Christian enterprise that are of continuing concern—personal evangelism through individual counseling, the guiding of university students toward a sense of meaning in life, and the "reconciling" of biblical truths with scientific discoveries.

James Kennedy's anthology is divided into three parts—the man, his message, and his methods—which together furnish sufficient biographical facts and selections from Drummond's writings to give an idea of his life, his influence, and what he had to say that is of lasting value or interest. Quite rightly, the middle section, the anthology proper, is the major part of the book, and it includes Drummond's most important addresses to university students and other groups, and short excerpts from his once widely read religio-scientific writings, *Natural Law in the Spiritual World* and *The Ascent of Man.* Each selection is preceded by an explanatory note indicating the circumstances that occasioned the address and, where necessary, the place of the excerpt in the larger argument from which it is taken.

The selections are, on the whole, representative and well-chosen, and the "Addresses to University Students" and "Christmas Booklets" make a valuable addition to any sermon collection. But the contemporary relevance and the brilliance of Drummond's thought—which at its best impressed men "as though a comet had flashed upon the view"—somehow eludes the reader, largely because of the arrangement of the material. Since Dr. Kennedy considers the "Contribution of Science to Christianity" a key to Drummond's attitude to science and higher biblical criticism and to his influence with students, he places this fine address first in the anthology, which he closes with short extracts from the much more "dated" *Natural Law* and *The Ascent of Man,* thereby robbing one of any sense of chronological development or cumulative power in Drummond's thinking. In addition, the last section of the book consists largely of the editor's discussion of Drummond's evangelistic methods, which makes a rather lame conclusion to the volume. These weaknesses, however, detract from the book's effectiveness rather than from its usefulness as an anthology, for much of "the best of Henry Drummond," which Dr. Kennedy professes to offer, is unquestionably here.

ELEANOR BUSTIN MATTES

Primer on Roman Catholicism for Protestants. By STANLEY I. STUBER. New York: Association Press, 1953. xii, 276 pp. $2.50.

No one can question the fact that Protestants ought to be better acquainted with the basic beliefs and practices of Roman Catholics. If this book is widely read, and we hope it will be, then this situation will be partially corrected. The subject falls into five principal divisions: Historical Background, the Papacy and How It Functions, the Belief of Catholics, the Practices of Catholics, and Areas of Conflict. In a series of short chapters within each section, the author presents the Roman Catholic belief and practice and then the Protestant position in rebuttal, with a brief list of contemporary Protestant references for further reading. The Roman Catholic sources are often radio addresses and popular manuals, but all have the Nihil Obstat and Imprimatur. The material is presented so simply and directly that the laity should be able to read it with as much satisfaction as the clergy, and even the best informed should find some of his misconceptions clarified and corrected.

It is in the presentation of the Protestant position that the book is weakest. The author states that Protestants believe that the New Testament preceded and paved the way for what we know today as the Church, in contrast with the Roman Catholic belief that the Church is the mother of the Bible. Of course, it is generally accepted in Protestant critical circles today that the Bible is the product of the believing and worshiping community, a product of the Church. Certainly it was the Church which determined the canon. There is a difference of opinion as to who should interpret the Bible,—there is no longer any serious question as to which came first, the Bible or the Church.

The author makes much of the fact that Protestants believe that Mary was the mother of Jesus and that Roman Catholics believe that Mary is the "Mother of God." It was at the Council of Ephesus in 431, over the protests of Nestorius, that the title, *Theotokos,* was sanctioned, with the explanation that Mary is the true mother, not of the Godhead itself, but of the Incarnate Logos, or Word of God, containing both the divine and human natures of Christ. No one can deny that the term, "Mother of God," is offensive to most Protestants, but it is true that, traditionally, most Protestants believe in the position of Mary thus defined.

We might add that the author gives the Thirty-nine Articles a position of authority in the Anglican Church which they do not rightfully hold. Obviously, he cannot do justice to all the exceptions to the "general" Protestant position. Occasionally, he is hortatory. These are not great faults, however. He gives the biblical basis for Protestant beliefs, and that is good. He cannot give an account of the faith dogmatically and rigidly defined, for such is not the genius of Protestantism. He could have alloted as much space to the Protestant position as to the Roman Catholic position; he could have revealed more of the fervor characteristic of the Reformers; and he could have provided a book which would have been read with even more enthusiasm in Protestant circles.

LEE A. BELFORD

The Names of Jesus. By VINCENT TAYLOR. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1953. ix, 175 pp. $3.00.

Dr. Vincent Taylor has recently published a full-length Commentary on St. Mark, designed to take the place of the great work by Swete, now out of print, in the Macmillan series. In philological depth and accuracy there is no rival to this already standard new work. His volumes on New Testament theology are widely and favorably known: *Forgiveness and Reconciliation, Jesus and His Sacrifice,* and *The Atonement in New Testament Teaching.* His still earlier work on form criticism, *The Formation of the Gospel Tradition,* has been for years a most useful introduction to this type of study; it is a moderate application of the principles of "tradition history." Now he has given us what must have begun as a *parergon* to the whole series of his books on New Testament interpretation.

The non-specialist will probably be amazed at the number of "names," i.e., titles, of Jesus in the New Testament. The few outstanding ones come to mind at once: Son of Joseph, Rabbi, Teacher, Master, Prophet, Christ, Son of David, Son of Man, Servant, Lord, Son of God—but there are many more, and Dr. Taylor studies them all. His work supplements Gustaf Dalman's famous *Words of Jesus* (1898; Eng. tr., 1902), and takes account of the work done in this field during the interval.

His conclusions are conservative—too conservative, many American New Testament scholars will think. "The only names which Jesus indubitably used of Himself are 'Son of Man,' 'Son of God,' and 'the Son' " (p. 66). From this inference further conclusions follow: (1) Primitive Christianity had a firm grasp upon the reality of Jesus' humanity (long before the Gnostic crisis and the reaction against it, and in spite of Paul's slight emphasis upon our Lord's humanity); (2) the titles also show how fully the primitive church recognized in him the Messiah of Jewish hopes; (3) "the complete moral and religious sovereignty of Jesus was expressed by the term 'Lord' "; finally, (4) the early church "found in Christ a relationship to God that was absolutely unique." This approach to the question makes it possible for those of us who question the use of these terms by Jesus himself, *in the later theological sense,* to make full use of Taylor's book. The rest of the volume, Part II, deals with titles unquestionably supplied by the church.

FREDERICK C. GRANT

Die Botschaft Jesu: Eine Traditionskritische und Exegetische Untersuchung. By ERNST PERCY. (Lund Universitets Årsskrift. N.F. Avd. 1. Bd 49. Nr 5.) Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1953. x, 324 pp. Kr. 32.

In the Preface to his impressive volume, the eminent author states that the problem of the message of Jesus which has arisen in connection with the eschatological interpretation of the Kingdom of God has never been satisfactorily solved, nor, indeed, a number of subsidiary problems arising from it.

Since it is impossible to review such a book as this in so brief a space, it seems best merely to list the chapter headings and their sub-headings: 1. Die Vorgeschichte; 2. Busspredigt und Heilbotschaft (I. Das Hauptproblem der Botschaft Jesu; II. Indirekte Zeugnisse über den Inhalt der Botschaft Jesu; III. Die Seligpreisungen der Bergpredigt; IV. Die Forderung der Busse); 3. Die Forderungen Jesu (I. Die Stellung Jesu zum Gesetz; II. Die Forderungen Jesu und das Gesetz; III. Die Forderung der Liebestaten an dem Nächsten; IV. Die Forderung der Entsagung in der Nachfolge Jesu); 4. Das Reich Gottes (I. Das zukünftige Gottesreich; II. Das Gottesreich und die Taten Jesu; III. Die Botschaft Jesu und das Reich Gottes; IV. Lk 17, 20 f.; V. Rückblick); 5. Der Menschensohn (I. Synoptische Zeugnisse für das messianische Bewusstein Jesu; II. Die Menschensohnaussagen; III. Der Vater und der Sohn; IV. Das Messiasgeheimnis im Markusevangelium).

An Introduction to the Study of the New Testament. By A. H. McNeile. 2nd ed., revised by C. S. C. Williams. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1953. 486 pp.

This new edition of a classic work published more than a quarter of a century ago restores to circulation a book which has been used extensively by a whole generation of Bible students. In order to make it useful to the present generation, a thorough revision was deemed necessary, on the grounds that "research has not stood still . . . and that some of McNeile's landmarks have been removed." How thorough the revision has been is proved by the great number of books and articles published since 1927 now appearing in bibliography and footnotes, which bring the work up to date.

The Four Gospels. A new translation by E. V. Rieu. London and New York: Penguin Books, 1953. 245 pp. 65¢.

In the Introduction we are told that "This new translation has behind it no denominational authority. It is a singlehanded effort, and the reader is invited to follow one guide only on a voyage of discovery." The translator feels that, by making use of the Codex Sinaiticus, the Codex Vaticanus, and the Codex Alexandrinus, it is now possible to get closer to the original meaning of the texts than every before. The King James Version, beautiful as it is, was based on Erasmus' Greek text, which relied on a now discredited twelfth century manuscript. He is also convinced that the use of modern English makes the meaning clearer to the general reader, which is justification enough.

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

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